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WELCOME TO THE WILD WEST: PROTECTING
ACCESS TO CROSS BORDER FERTILITY
CARE IN THE UNITED STATES
Kimberly M. Mutcherson*
As has been the case with other types of medical tourism, the phe-
nomenon of cross border fertility care ("CBFC") has sparked concern
about the lack of global or even national harmonization in the regulation
of the fertility industry. The diversity of laws around the globe leads
would-be parents to forum shop for a welcoming place to make babies.
Focusing specifically on the phenomenon of travel to the United States,
this Article takes up the question of whether there should be any legal
barriers to those who come to the United States seeking CBFC. In part,
CBFC suffers from the same general concerns raised about the use of
fertility treatment in general, but it is possible to imagine a subset of
arguments that would lead to forbidding or at least discouraging people
from coming to the United States for CBFC, either as a matter of law or
policy. This paper stands in opposition to any such effort and contem-
plates the moral and ethical concerns about CBFC and how, and if,
those concerns warrant expression in law.
Part I describes the conditions that lead some couples and individu-
als to leave their home countries to access fertility treatments abroad
and details why the United States, with its comparatively liberal regula-
tion of ART, has become a popular CBFC destination for travelers from
around the world. Part II offers and refutes arguments supporting
greater domestic control over those who seek to satisfy their desires for
CBFC in the United States by reasserting the importance of the right of
procreation while also noting appropriate concerns about justice and
equality in the market for babies. Part III continues the exploration of
justice by investigating the question of international cooperation in legis-
lating against perceived wrongs. This Part concludes that consistent
* Associate Professor of Law, Rutgers School of Law, Camden. This Article and its
companion book chapter have benefitted from the input of participants in the Globalization of
Medicine: Legal and Ethical Challenges conference sponsored by the Petrie-Flom Center for
Health Law Policy, Biotechnology and Bioethics at Harvard Law School as well as colleagues
at the 2011 Annual Health Law Professor's Conference, including John Robertson. I am also
grateful for input offered by I. Glenn Cohen and Kimberly Kessler Ferzan. Many thanks to
Ashley Gagnon, Jacquie T. Huynh-Linenberg, Ross Mazer and Brian Morrison at Rutgers, and
Erin Train and Jamie Gershkow at the Earle Mack School of Law at Drexel University for
their research assistance.
349
350 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 22:349
legislation across borders is appropriate where there is consensus about
the wrong of an act, but it is unnecessary and inappropriate where there
remain cultural conflicts about certain practices-in this case assisted
reproduction.
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INTRODUCTION
What do the son of a Hong Kong-based billionaire' and a British
couple desperate to save their child's life have in common? 2 While it
sounds like the start of a very odd joke, the link between these people is
I Peter Lee, the 47-year-old unmarried son of a Hong Kong billionaire, garnered press
attention when he announced the arrival of triplets reportedly born to a surrogate mother in
California. Cathy Yan, Maternal Mystery: Babies Bring Joy, and Questions, in Hong Kong,
WAuL Sr. J. (Dec. 14, 2010), available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB 1000142405274870
3471904576002913040745224.html. Hong Kong made surrogacy illegal in 2000 when it
passed the Human Reproductive Technology Ordinance. Id.
2 See Charlie Whitaker Cured by 'Saviour Sibling', BIoNEws (Aug. 22, 2005), http://
www.bionews.org.uk/page_12478.asp [hereinafter Whitaker]. In 2004, in the United King-
dom, Charlie Whitaker's family sought permission from the Human Fertilization and Embryol-
ogy Association (HFEA), the British authority that regulates the use of assisted reproductive
technology (ART), to use pre-implantation genetic diagnosis (PGD) to create a savior sibling.
See id. At the time of their request, Charlie was in desperate need of a bone marrow trans-
plant, but no living donor could be found for him. See id. His parents wanted to screen
embryos for donor compatibility with Charlie so that they could use their new child's umbili-
cal cord blood stem cells to save Charlie's life. See id. The HFEA turned down their request
and the family travelled to the United States for treatment where they successfully used PGD
to give birth to a child who was a perfect donor for Charlie. See id.; see also How is PIT
Regulated in the United Kingdom?, Hum. FERTILISATION & EMBRYOLOcY AUrH., http://
www.hfea.gov.uk/5932.html (last visited Oct. 21, 2011) [hereinafter PIT Regulated] (discuss-
ing the United Kingdom's decision to allow preimplantation tissue typing as of 2008).
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that they successfully sought cross-border fertility care (CBFC).3 CBFC
refers to individuals who travel from their home countries to access as-
sisted reproductive technology (ART) to facilitate the process of creating
a pregnancy where coital reproduction has failed or is otherwise not an
option.4 Such travel has become more popular and more possible in a
world of increasing infertility and ever-advancing techniques that allow
the infertile to have biologically or genetically related children.5
Along with creating babies for people who want them, ART brings
substantial ethical anxieties that spark deep and wide-ranging discussion
about appropriate regulation and use of such technology. Coupled with
the disquiet attendant to globalization, the fact that some people, given
the means, will leave their home countries to take advantage of such
technologies-especially when they do so in order to make use of tech-
nology in a way that is forbidden by the laws of the home country-
ignites debate about procreation, exploitation, commodification, and
even the relationships between and among nations.
In light of concerns that some have raised about the lack of global
or even national harmonization in ART regulation that leads to forum
shopping for a welcoming place to make babies, this Article takes up the
question of whether there should be any legal barriers to those who come
to the United States seeking CBFC. This Article refers to this group as
reproductive travelers to distinguish them from individuals who are na-
tive users of the technology. 6 While the phenomenon of CBFC cannot
resist being swallowed by general debates about ART, especially in the
United States where the lack of strong or consistent regulation of the
3 This Article borrows this term from individuals working outside the legal arena. See,
e.g., Karl Nygren et al., Cross-Border Fertility Care-International Committee Monitoring
Assisted Reproductive Technologies Global Survey: 2006 Data and Estimates, 94 FETI-wrarfY &
STERIrry e4, e4 (June 2010). Many commentators use the term reproductive tourism to refer
to such travel. As Dr. Guido Pennings explains, however, "[tiourism mainly refers to travel-
ling for recreational reasons. Indirectly, this connotation devalues the desire motivating the
journey; it implies that the fertility tourist goes abroad to look for something exotic and
strange." Guido Pennings, Reproductive Tourism as Moral Pluralism in Motion, 28 J. MEr.
ErHics 337, 337 (2002) [hereinafter Pennings, Reproductive Tourism]. I think it inappropriate
to perpetuate the use of a term that may belittle those to whom it is applied, even if that is not
the intent of the individual employing the phrase. Therefore, I embrace the term cross border
fertility care as used by other scholars. See id.
4 See Nygren et al., supra note 3, at e4.
5 Silvia Spring, The Trade in Fertility, THE DAILY BEAST (Apr. I1, 2006, 8:00 PM),
http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2006/04/11/the-trade-in-fertility.html (noting a "bur-
geoning fertility tourism trade" to developing nations fueled by "[ciheaper prices, high-quality
health care and the availability of donor eggs and surrogates.").
6 For ease of discussion, this Article distinguishes reproductive travelers from native
users. The term native user is only a way to indicate a category of users who are already in the
United States as contrasted with people who travel to the United States to use reproductive
technology. I do not use these designations as a way of delineating the worth of any particular
user or to signal a preference for one group over another.
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fertility industry leads to much consternation,7 it is possible to imagine a
subset of arguments that would lead to forbidding or at least discourag-
ing people from coming to the United States for CBFC, either as a matter
of law or policy. This Article opposes any such effort and contemplates
various moral and ethical concerns about CBFC and how, and if, those
concerns warrant expression in law.
Part I describes the conditions that lead some couples and individu-
als to leave their home countries to access fertility treatments abroad and
details why the United States, with its comparatively liberal set of ART
regulations, has become a popular CBFC destination for travelers from
around the world. Part II offers and refutes arguments supporting greater
domestic control over those who seek to satisfy their desires for CBFC in
the United States by reasserting the importance of the right of procrea-
tion while also noting appropriate concerns about justice and equality in
the market for babies. Part III continues the exploration of justice by
investigating the question of international cooperation in legislating
against perceived wrongs. This Part concludes that consistent legislation
across borders is appropriate where there is consensus about the wrong
of an act, but it is unnecessary and inappropriate where there remain
cultural conflicts about certain practices-in this case, assisted
reproduction.
I. WHY DO PEOPLE TRAVEL? MAKING BABIES IN THE U.S.A.
"The ethics of [reproductive] exile suggest that both justice and
compassion are necessary to assure individual autonomy and respect in
the maintenance of reproductive rights. "8
While it is clear that many people travel for CBFC,9 why people
make these pilgrimages is a separate question from whether any govern-
ment or society should support or discourage citizens who make these
7 See, e.g., NAoMI R. CAHN, TEST TuBE FAMILIES: WHY THE FERT- I ffY MARKET NEEDS
LEGAL REGULATION 2-3 (2009) (discussing the need to use an ethical approach to create laws
regulating assisted reproduction that respect human dignity and suggesting various ways in
which the fertility industry should be regulated to respond to concerns about possible harms,
especially to children); Michele Bratcher Goodwin, Baby Markets, in BABY MARKETS: MONEY
AND THE NEW POLflCS OF CREATING FAMILIES 2, 2 (Michele Bratcher Goodwin ed., 2010)
(anthology of essays in which authors discuss the complicated nature of economic transactions
that result in the creation of children and families); June Carbone, Who Decides What Number
of Children Is "Right"?, 104 Nw. U. L. REv. 109, 109 (2009) (raising issues about whether it
is appropriate to legally regulate the number of embryos used in an IVF cycle).
8 Marcia C. Inhorn & Pasquale Patrizio, Rethinking Reproductive "Tourism" as Repro-
ductive "Exile," 92 FERTILITY & STERILITY 904, 906 (2009).
9 See, e.g., Nygren et al., supra note 3, at e5 ("As in the past, at present people who
believe that they do not have access to the kind of treatment they need, or rather a proportion
of such people (with a different proportion in different settings), cross borders to search for it.
It is expected that all countries will experience some level of CBFC."); see also, Guido Pen-
nings et al., ESHRE Task Force on Ethics and Law 15: Cross-border Reproductive Care, 23
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trips. This Part addresses the easier of the two questions-the "why"
question.
People use ART because they desire to have children but either can-
not or opt not to do so through coital reproduction. 10 They travel for
ART often because the intricacies of local regulation and local custom
make travel necessary or desirable even when ART is available in the
home country." The vastness of the fertility industry reflects the sub-
stantial number of people around the globe who experience difficulty in
their attempts to become pregnant through coital reproduction.12 Medi-
cal infertilityl 3 is a global phenomenon with a worldwide estimate of 9%
prevalence for current infertility and 16% prevalence for lifetime infertil-
ity in couples in fertile age groups.' 4 Millions of people qualify as infer-
tile under the medical definition of that term.' 5 Infertility, however, need
not be confined to its medical definition. Some individuals use ART not
Hum. REPROD. 2182, 2182 (2008) [hereinafter Pennings et al., ESHRE] ("Cross-border medi-
cal care is a growing phenomenon.").
10 See, e.g., MARGARET MARSH AND WANDA RONNER, THE EMPTY CRADLE: INFERTILITY
IN AMERICA FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO THE PRESENT 2 (1996) (describing the increasing turn
to fertility treatment as a response to the inability to reproduce); Karen Sermon et al., Review:
Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis, 363 LANCET 1633, 1633 (2004) (describing the use of IVF
and preimplantation genetic diagnosis to avoid genetic disease in future children).
11 See 1. Glenn Cohen, Circumvention Tourism, 97 CORNELL L. REv. 1309, 1323 (2012)
(describing the vast array of limitations on the uses of assisted reproduction, including surro-
gacy, around the globe). It is the case that "[m]odern diagnostic and treatment services are
available in most countries." Nygren et al., supra note 3, at e5. For instance, India has created
a booming business in surrogacy by providing access to a service that can be prohibitively
costly in other parts of the world or banned altogether. See, e.g., Rina Chandran, Poverty
Makes Surrogates of Indian Women in Gujarat, REUTERS (Apr. 8, 2009, 12:47 PM), http://
www.reuters.com/article/2009/04/08/us-india-surrogate-idUSBOMI574520090408.
12 See Abdallah S. Daar & Zara Merali, Infertility and Social Suffering: The Case of ART
in Developing Countries, in CURRENT PRACTICES AND CONTROVERSIES IN AssIsTED REPRO-
DUCTION: REPORT OF A MEETING ON MEDICAL, ETHICAL AND SOCIAL ASPECTS OF ASiSIED
REPRODUCTION" HELD AT WHO HEADQUARTERS IN GENEVA, SWrIZERLAND 17-21 SEPTEMBER
2001, at 15 (Effy Vayena et al. eds., 2002). Historically, infertility was viewed "as sent by the
Gods, possibly as punishment, or representing a personal fate, or just bad luck . .. Infertility
is today regarded as a global public health issue." Nygren et al., supra note 3, at e4. As such,
there is increasing attention paid to the fertility gap, meaning the disproportionate impact of
infertility in some communities along with increased concern about the steps that people will
take to circumvent their own fertility challenges. Daar & Merali, supra, at 15-16.
13 Medical infertility generally refers to a failure to achieve pregnancy after a year of
unprotected heterosexual intercourse. Infertility FAQs, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND
PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/reproductivehealthInfertility/index.htm (last visited Apr. 10,
2011). A person over the age of 35 will be labeled infertile if pregnancy is not achieved after
six months of unprotected sexual intercourse. Id. Being able to get pregnant without being
able to carry that pregnancy to term is also a form of infertility. Id. This Article uses the term
medical infertility to distinguish from other circumstances in which a person or couple might
want or need to access ART for reasons other than inability to achieve pregnancy without
medical assistance.
14 Nygren et al., supra note 3, at e5.
15 See Jacky Boivin, et al., International Estimates of Infertility Prevalence and Treat-
ment-Seeking: Potential Need and Demand for Infertility Medical Care, 22 Hum. REPROD.
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because they are physically incapable of either becoming pregnant or
creating a pregnancy through coital reproduction, but because of social
or other factors that stand as obstacles to procreating.16 People who fall
into this category of social or situational infertility are in same-sex rela-
tionships, single, or harbor genes for disease or disability that they do not
wish to pass on to their children.' 7 While the socially or situationally
infertile may not comprise the largest segment of those who use ART in
general,18 they are an important segment of reproductive travelers.
1506, 1510 (2007). One study found that on a global scale 72.4 million people are currently
infertile and that approximately 40.5 million are seeking infertility treatment. Id.
16 There are many ways that people have articulated infertility as a non-medical phenom-
enon. One term for this category of people is "social factor infertility." Connie Shapiro, No
Heterosexual Partner? It's Called "Social Factor Infertility," PSYCHOL. TODAY (Mar. 4,
2010), http://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/when-youre-not-expecting/201003/no-hetero-
sexual-partner-its-called-social-factor-infertility. Others use the term to describe individuals
who are medically fertile, but who may still find cause to use ART in order to become preg-
nant. See, e.g., LAURA MAMO, QUEERING REPRODuCriON: ACHIEVING PREGNANCY IN THE AGE
OF TECHNOSCIENCE 2 (2007) (describing a lesbian using ART to become pregnant as having a
"social" rather than medical problem). Lisa Ikemoto uses the term dysfertile to describe the
dysfunction that the discourse on infertility attributes to gay men and lesbians who use ART to
procreate. Lisa C. Ikemoto, The InIFertile, the Too Fertile, and the Dysfertile, 47 HASTINGS
L.J. 1007, 1009 (1996).
17 Adrienne Asch & Rebecca Marmor, Assisted Reproduction, in FRoM BIRTH TO DEATH
AND) BENCH TO CLINIC: THE HASTINGS CENTER BIOETHICS BRIEFING BOOK FOR JOURNALISTS,
PouICYMAKERS, AND CAMPAIGNS 5, 7 (Mary Crowley ed., 2008) (noting that "ARTs are in-
creasingly sought by those who cannot reproduce using only their own genetic and biological
capacities. Heterosexual and same-sex couples and single women and men who seek to have
biologically connected children frequently turn to clinics and agencies for 'donors' who pro-
vide sperm, eggs, or gestational services, usually for a fee."). See also, LIZA MUNDY, EVERY-
THING CONCEIVABLE: How AssISTED REPRODUCTION IS CHANGING OUR WORLD 11 (2007)
[hereinafter MUNDY, EVERYTHING CONCEIVABLE] ("Single mothers, lesbians, and gay men are
among the fastest-growing groups of assisted reproductive technology patients."). Mundy also
notes that another group of ART patients are those who "suffer from, or carry a gene for, a
genetic disease such as cystic fibrosis, Huntington's disease, hemophilia, Tay-Sachs disease,
or even a propensity for certain adult-onset cancers, and who want to use IVF, combined with
genetic testing, to create children who are unafflicted." Id.
18 Making claims about who does and does not use assisted reproduction can be difficult
because robust data on the demographics of the market is not always widely available. It is
certainly the case that there are fertility brokers who not only serve large numbers of gay and
lesbian clients, but who also cater to that market, as evidenced by the existence of Rainbow
Flag Health Services which actively recruits gay and bisexual men as donors and which caters
to the lesbian and gay community as fertility clients. See RAINBow FLAG HEALTH SERVICES,
http://gayspermbank.com/ (last visited Oct. 21, 2012); see also, MUNDY, EVERYTHING CON-
CEIVABLE supra note 17, at 129 (noting that in Los Angeles there are fertility practices that
cater to gay men). Similarly, advances in male infertility treatment have increased the percent-
age of women who use sperm-banks, especially lesbians, making the market for sperm largely
dependent on women. Id. at 115 (noting that women had become 60% of sperm bank users).
Even so, the fertility industry is largely geared towards those who are medically infertile, and
the National Survey of Family Growth (NSFG), estimated in 2002 that "7.3 million American
women aged 15-44 years had impaired fecundity (i.e., experienced difficulties conceiving or
bringing a pregnancy to term during their lifetime)" and that "[t]wo million couples in the
United States were infertile (i.e., had not conceived during the previous 12 months despite
trying)." A Public Health Focus on Infertility Prevention, Detection, and Management,
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As an offshoot of the more widely reported phenomenon of medical
travel or tourism,' 9 CBFC shares with that broader phenomenon a lack of
good data about who travels, where they travel, and what services they
receive, among other useful information. 20 This dearth of information
exists for a variety of reasons including reluctance on the part of those
engaging in such travel to share information about their quest.21 Solid
numbers notwithstanding, "most of the experts who analyse [sic] the
phenomenon . . . agree that cross-border reproductive care will continue
to increase in the coming years." 2 2
The reasons for reproductive travel can vary, but those reasons tend
to coalesce around some common themes illustrated by the following
hypothetical scenarios:
CENTER FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/reproductivehealth/In-
fertility/Whitepaper-PG2.htm (last visited October 19, 2012).
19 See Diane York, Medical Tourism: The Trend Toward Outsourcing Medical Proce-
dures to Foreign Countries, 28 J. CONTINUING Eouc. HEALTH PROFS. 99, 99 (2008) (describ-
ing the phenomenon of medical travel); Michael D. Horowitz et al., Medical Tourism:
Globalization of the Healthcare Marketplace, 9 MEDSCAPE GENERAL MED. 33, 33-34 (2007).
20 See L. Culley, et al., Crossing Borders for Fertility Treatment: Motivations, Destina-
tions and Outcomes of UK Fertility Travelers, 26 Hum. REPROD. 2373, 2373 (2011) (citations
omitted). As the study notes in reference to fertility travel, "there has been little systematic
study of this apparently growing phenomenon. Therefore, while there is evidence of cross-
border fertility treatment occurring in many countries across the globe, there are few robust
data on incidence." Id. Popular media sometimes refers to this phenomenon as fertility tour-
ism. These terms for the phenomenon of traveling to receive fertility treatment have been
criticized as trivializing the phenomenon and its origins given that many patients who travel
for fertility care make "considerable sacrifices of resources and emotion in the hope to become
parents." Bernard M. Dickens, Legal Developments in Assisted Reproduction, 101 INT'L J.
GYNEcOLOGY & OBSTETRIcs 211, 214 (2008). Dickens continues, "commitment to this goal
[of becoming parents] warrants . . . respect due to other patients seeking to overcome disabil-
ity, without discrimination in health service professional access or attitude." Id. This Article
eschews that term because the notion of tourism suggests something flippant or fanciful, which
is inappropriate in the context of seeking serious medical care. As Dr. Guido Pennings ex-
plains, "[t]ourism mainly refers to travelling for recreational reasons. Indirectly, this connota-
tion devalues the desire motivating the journey: it implies that the fertility tourist goes abroad
to look for something exotic and strange." Pennings, Reproductive Tourism, supra note 3, at
337. Others have suggested the use of the term reproductive exile, rather than reproductive
tourism, as exile more accurately describes the sense that those seeking CBFC may feel
"'forced' to leave their home countries to access safe, effective, affordable, and legal infertility
care." Inhom & Patrizio, supra note 8, at 905. Some criticize the use of the word exile
because it connotes punishment, which may sometimes be an accurate description of the forces
that drive people from their home countries, but not always. See Guido Pennings, Letters to
the Editor, Reply: Reproductive Exile Versus Reproductive Tourism, 20 HuM. REPROD. 3571,
3571 (2005). I sympathize with these concerns and think it inappropriate to perpetuate the use
of a term that has the potential to belittle those to whom it is applied, even if that is not the
intent of the individual employing the phrase.
21 See Anna Pia Ferraretti et al., Cross-border Reproductive Care: A Phenomenon Ex-
pressing the Controversial Aspects of Reproductive Technologies, 20 REPROD. BIOMEDICINE
ONLINE 261, 263 (2010).
22 Id. at 265.
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Scenario 1: A 62-year-old post-menopausal British woman comes to
the United States with the goal of being inseminated with the sperm of
her now deceased brother who, for reasons only the two of them under-
stand, left the frozen sperm to her in his will with the request that she use
it to become pregnant and bear a child.23
Scenario 2: A legally married lesbian couple from Canada comes to
the United States to purchase and use sperm from a United States-based
cryobank because they want access to sperm from a seller who will re-
main anonymous.
Scenario 3: A single man from France comes to the United States to
purchase an egg that he will fertilize with his sperm and then implant in a
gestational carrier in California, to whom he will pay a fee of $15,000 in
exchange for her reproductive labor.
Scenario 4: A married Italian couple, both of whom are otherwise
fertile, travels to the United States for in vitro fertilization (IVF)2 4 COU-
pled with pre-implantation genetic diagnosis (PGD), 25 which will allow
them to transfer only female embryos and avoid the risk of passing on a
sex-linked disease.26
Scenario 5: A couple from India travels to the United States to use
PGD in conjunction with IVF to screen for male embryos in order to
effectuate a cultural and personal preference for sons.
All of the individuals described in the preceding scenarios might be
compelled or obliged to travel abroad to achieve their desires because
they cannot be pursued legally in their countries of origin. The laws on
ART on a global scale are varied and range from the very restrictive to
slightly restrictive, though there are few countries with an active ART
industry that could accurately be called highly permissive whereby all
23 It is possibly apocryphal, but one scholar references a story about a 62-year-old
French woman who came to the United States seeking a fertility specialist who would insemi-
nate her with her brother's sperm. Pennings, Reproductive Tourism, supra note 3, at 337. Of
course, given that a 62-year-old woman is almost certainly post-menopausal, a true attempt to
get pregnant would require the use of eggs from a much younger woman coupled with in vitro
fertilization.
24 In vitro fertilization (IVF) is a technique that involves fertilizing ova outside of the
body and then transferring the fertilized ova to the uterus of a woman who is a willing carrier.
See AM. Soc'y FOR RiPROD. MED., Assis-oo REPRODUCTIV-E TECHNOLOGY: A GUnI FOR
PATIENrs 4 (2011), available at http://www.sart.org/uploadedFiles/ASRM-Content/Re-
sources/PatientResources/FactSheetsandInfo_Booklets/ART.pdf. That woman might in-
tend to parent the child to whom she will give birth, but she might also be a surrogate.
25 See Sermon et al., supra note 10, at 1633.
26 "X-linked diseases are single gene disorders that reflect the presence of defective
genes on the X chromosome." See Richard Twyman, X-linked Diseases: Single Gene Disor-
ders Caused by Defective Gene on the X Chromosome, WELLi COME TRUST (Apr. 16, 2003),
http://genome.wellcome.ac.uk/doc-wtd02085l.html.
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reproductive desires can be satisfied.27 On the list of the most banned
procedures on a global scale are "surrogacy, social sex selection, gamete
donation, preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD) and screening
(PGS)." 28 Thus, as described in more detail below, one reason for travel
is that a specific service has been banned in a traveler's home country.
Legality of specific uses of technology aside, a broad systemic
driver of CBFC is discrimination. Some individuals or couples travel to
the United States to access fertility care that is available in their country
of origin, but to which local laws deny them access as a form of invidi-
ous discrimination. For instance, in some countries where ART is other-
wise available, perhaps even widely available, access to the technology is
denied to same sex couples, single gay people, or couples who are casu-
ally cohabitating.29  Often these restrictions are based on perceptions
about what is in the best interest of a child and go hand-in-hand with
systems that treat the use of ART as akin to adoption. 30 In these regimes,
any interest or right a person has to procreate is secondary to the state's
interest in requiring that babies created through ART be born into family
structures the state believes are most likely to afford a foundation for a
good life. In many parts of the world, homes that do not include a mar-
27 Even in the more permissive United States, human cloning for purposes of reproduc-
tion is explicitly illegal in many states. See Human Cloning Laws, NAT' 1. CONFERENCE OF
SrATEr LEGISLATORS, http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/health/human-cloning-laws.aspx
(last updated Jan. 2008). It is also the case that sperm cannot be used for purposes of artificial
insemination without certain laboratory testing protocols. See U.S. Dep't of Health & Hum.
Services, What You Should Know - Reproductive Tissue Donation, FDA (Nov. 5, 2010), http://
www.fda.gov/BiologicsBloodVaccines/SafetyAvailability/TissueSafety/ucm232876.htm
(describing regulations governing the "donation" of sperm and eggs) [hereinafter FDA].
28 Ferraretti et al., supra note 21, at 262.
29 See Connie Cho, Defining Parenthood: Assisted Reproduction in France, 7 YALE J.
MED. & L. 19, 19 (Spring 2011). France restricts access to "only heterosexual, young, medi-
cally infertile couples that have been married or have cohabitated for at least two years." Id.
These restrictions in French law are based on the concept of projet parental ("responsible
parenthood"), which is premised on the idea that a child's right to good parenting trumps a
potential parent's right to have a child. See id. Italy's law also limits use of ART to people
who are legally married or in committed heterosexual relationships. V. Fineschi et al., The
New Italian Law on Assisted Reproduction Technology (Law 40/2004), 31 J. Mmi. Ertcs
536, 537 (2005).
30 See I. Glenn Cohen, Regulating Reproduction: The Problem with Best Interests, 96
MINN. L. REV. 423, 456 (2011)(rejecting the use of the best interests of the child rationale to
justify regulation of reproduction). This author argues elsewhere that ART and adoption are
substantially different and that ART, therefore, is best treated as akin to coital reproduction
rather than as a form of adoption. See Kimberly Mutcherson, Procreative Pluralism: Defend-
ing the Right to Reproduce without Sex (unpublished article) (on file with author). See also,
Melanie B. Jacobs, Procreation Through ART Why the Adoption Process Should Not Apply, 35
CAP. U. L. REv. 399, 399 (2006). Another way of critiquing comparisons between ART and
actions taken for existing children is through a rejection of the idea of acting in the best
interest of children not yet conceived. See, e.g., Cohen, supra, at 426 (arguing that the best
interest of the child trope is wholly misplaced in the context of considering regulating repro-
duction to the extent that the regulation actually results in a child not being conceived.).
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ried, heterosexual couple are not seen as fit places to raise a child or are
deemed homes in which there is no right to create a child of the relation-
ship.3 1 Ironically, access rules may drive some individuals away from
health systems that might otherwise provide much cheaper or even free
access to ART.32
This legal backdrop explains why in Scenario I a woman from the
United Kingdom travels to the United States for artificial insemination.
The patient's age, desire to procreate with a person who is dead, status as
single, and efforts to use sperm from her brother, would all disqualify her
from proceeding with her plan in her home country. 33 The Human Fer-
tilisation and Embryology Act of 1990 established the legislative frame-
work that governs ART in the United Kingdom. The Act also created the
Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority (HFEA), which has
ongoing responsibility for overseeing the use of ART in the United King-
dom. 34 The HFEA licenses clinics that work with ART clients, and the
web of regulations on that work is dense. As part of their work, licensed
clinics are required to take account "of the welfare of any child who may
be born as a result of the treatment [to be provided] (including the need
of that child for supportive parenting), and of any other child who may
be affected by the birth." 35 One can only get a sense of the specificity
31 For many years, researchers have worked to rebut the myths about parenting by lesbi-
ans and gay men that have led to negative outcomes in courts and in public policy making.
See CHARLOn3 J. PATTERSON, LESBIAN AND GAY PARENTS AND THEIR CHILDREN: SUMMARY
oiF RESEARCH FINDINGs 5, 5 (Am. Psychological Ass'n ed., 2005), available at http://
www.apa.org/pillgbt/resources/parenting-full.pdf. Three concerns have historically been asso-
ciated with judicial decision making in custody litigation and public policies governing foster
care and adoption: the belief that lesbians and gay men are mentally ill, that lesbians are less
maternal than heterosexual women, and that lesbians' and gay men's relationships with sexual
partners leave little time for ongoing parent-child interactions. Id. at 7.
32 Some number of those who travel to the United States for CBFC pay more for fertility
care than they would have paid had they remained in their origin countries where the cost of
ART is a standard part of subsidized healthcare. Assuming that a patient meets the criteria, the
National Health Service in the United Kingdom will cover the cost of fertility treatment for
eligible patients. See NHS Fertility Treatment, Hum. FERTILISATION & EMBRYOI.ooY AunT.,
http://www.hfea.gov.uk/fertility-treatment-cost-nhs.html (last updated May 9, 2012). In other
countries, like Israel, the government pays for fertility care as a way of encouraging birth
among its citizens. See Frida Simonstein, IVF Policies with Emphasis on Israeli Practices, 97
HEALTH PoL'Y 202, 203 (2010). See also Joseph G. Schenker, Assisted Reproductive Technol-
ogy in Israel, 33 J. OnsnImfl-RICS & GYNAECOLOGY RFS., S51, S51 (2007 Supp. 1). The ex-
change rate for public financing is often significant limits on who may use government
financed fertility services.
33 See The Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act, 1990, c. 37, § 4 (U.K.).
34 See id. at § 8.
35 Id. at § 13(5). On the question of supportive parenting, guidance issued by HFEA
states:
When considering a child's need for supportive parenting, centres [sic] should con-
sider the following definition: 'Supportive parenting is a commitment to the health,
well being and development of the child. It is presumed that all prospective parents
will be supportive parents, in the absence of any reasonable cause for concern that
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with which the HFEA expects this pre-parenting fitness screening to be
conducted by reading the factors that clinics should take into account.
They are:
(a) past or current circumstances that may lead to any
child . . . experiencing serious physical or psycho-
logical harm or neglect, for example:
(i) previous convictions relating to harming
children
(ii) child protection measures taken regarding ex-
isting children, or
(iii) violence or serious discord in the family
environment
(b) past or current circumstances that are likely to lead
to an inability to care throughout childhood for any
child who may be born, or that are already seriously
impairing the care of any existing child of the fam-
ily, for example:
(i) mental or physical conditions
(ii) drug or alcohol abuse
(iii) medical history, where the medical history indi-
cates that any child who may be born is likely
to suffer from a serious medical condition, or
(iv) circumstances that the centre [sic] considers
likely to cause serious harm to any child men-
tioned above. 3 6
These requirements are a small slice of a lengthy guidance docu-
ment with sections dealing with surrogacy, 37 pre-implantation genetic di-
agnosis, 38 counseling requirements,39 and compensation for gamete
donors, among other topics. 40 Faced with these stringent requirements,
high-tech incest, consensual posthumous reproduction, or post-meno-
pausal pregnancy for a single woman will never pass muster.
any child who may be born, or any other child, may be at risk of significant harm or
neglect. Where centres [sic] have concern as to whether this commitment exists,
they may wish to take account of wider family and social networks within which the
child will be raised.'
Hum. Fertilisation & Embryology Auth. Code of Practice, Guidance Notes § 8.11 (8th ed.,
2009), available at http://www.hfea.gov.uk/docs/8thCode-ofPractice.pdf [hereinafter HFEA
Guidance].
36 HFEA Guidance, supra note 35, at § 8.10.
37 See id. at § 14.
38 See id. at § 10.
39 See id. at § 3.
40 See id. at § 13.
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In scenario 2, the couple could not make a child with an anonymous
sperm seller because Canada made it illegal to sell sperm in 2004;41
therefore, they would be obliged to travel in order to access this service.
Some countries allow the use of purchased or donated sperm42 for in
vitro fertilization (IVF),43 but Canada does not stand alone in its prohibi-
tions on the sale of sperm and anonymity. For instance, Austria, Ger-
many, Italy, Tunisia and Turkey do not allow the sale of sperm;44 sperm
donors or sellers can be anonymous in France and Greece, but they must
be identified or identifiable in the Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden.45
Similar prohibitions exist for the use of eggs in Germany, Italy, Norway,
Switzerland, Tunisia, Turkey, China, Croatia, Egypt, Japan, Morocco,
and the Philippines, while the use of such eggs is permitted in at least 21
other countries.46
In scenario 3, the person seeking CBFC would need to leave France
to engage in a commercial surrogacy arrangement because France made
commercial surrogacy a criminal offense in 199147 and because the
country's tight control over ART includes refusing to provide this care to
people who are single.48 Prohibitions on commercial surrogacy are glob-
ally widespread; the United Kingdom and Canada make commercial sur-
rogacy illegal. 49
In scenario 4, travel is necessary because Italy has some of the
strictest laws on ART in the world and those laws forbid couples from
refusing to transfer embryos in an IVF cycle even if PGD reveals anoma-
lies in the embryos or for any other reason.50 Finally, the couple in sce-
41 See Assisted Hum. Reprod. Act, S.C. 2004, c. 2, § 7 (Can.). See also, Alison Motluk,
Canadian Court Bans Anonymous Sperm and Egg Donation, NATURE (May 27, 2011), http://
www.nature.com/news/2011/1 10527/full/news.2011.329.htm] (describing a Canadian High
Court Ruling eliminating complete anonymity in the sale of sperm or ova).
42 In the interest of accuracy, this Article refrains from the convention of using the term
donor to describe the men and women who sell sperm and ova in a thriving gamete market.
Donor is a factually inaccurate term given that the gametes are sold, not donated. I also reject
the language of donation for fear that it attempts to mask the commerce inherent in the baby-
making industry. One need not reject the language of commerce in order to properly respect
the ethical and legal intricacies of a market that creates people.
43 See Donation, 87 FERTILITY & STERILITY S28, S28 (2007) [hereinafter Donation].
Countries such as Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Chile, China, India, Lithuania, Mexico, Singa-
pore, South Africa, Thailand, and the United States allow for the use of donor sperm in IVF.
Id.
44 Id. See also Ferraretti et al., supra note 21, at 262.
45 Donation, supra note 43, at S28.
46 Id. at S31.
47 See Mina Chang, Womb for Rent: India's Commercial Surrogacy, HARV. INT'L REV.,
11, 12(2009).
48 See Cho, supra note 29, at 19.
49 Many countries that have legislated on the issue have banned commercial surrogacy.
See Chang, supra note 47, at 12; Assisted Hum. Reprod. Act, S.C. 2004, c. 2, § 6(1) (Can.).
5o See Fineschi et al., supra note 29, at 537.
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nario 5 would leave India because that country has legislated against sex
selection,5' a practice that has led to skewed sex ratios in the country and
claims of millions of "missing" girls because parents exercise son prefer-
ence through abortions after prenatal ultrasounds. 52 Thirty-six countries
around the globe, including Canada, China, Germany, Russia, Singapore,
and the United Kingdom, have laws or policies that prevent sex
selection.5 3
On a range of issues and in many countries, a citizen might find his
procreative desires thwarted by the laws that bind him while on his home
soil. By contrast, it is less clear that any of the possible scenarios are
illegal in the United States, which has a well-documented if not com-
pletely deserved reputation as the Wild West of fertility treatment be-
cause of its comparative lack of strong regulation of the multi-billion
dollar fertility industry.54 No state or federal laws ban anonymous sperm
sales and the market for sperm in the United States is brisk, in part be-
cause the ban of such sales in other countries has spurred an international
market.5 5 The sale of ova is also a big business in the United States and
51 See The Prenatal Diagnostic Techniques (Regulation and Prevention of Misuse)
Amendment Act, 2002, No. 14, Acts of Parliament, 2003 (India). The Act also limits the use
of prenatal diagnosis to a list of selected congenital conditions and prohibits using these tech-
niques for sex determination of the fetus. See The Prenatal Diagnostic Techniques (Regulation
and Prevention of Misuse) Act, 1994, No. 57, Acts of Parliament, 1994 (India).
52 Mohit Sahni et al., Missing Girls in India: Infanticide, Feticide and Made-to-Order
Pregnancies? Insights from Hospital-Based Sex-Ratio-at-Birth over the Last Century, 3 PLoS
ONE 1,l (May 21, 2008), http://www.plosone.org/article/info:doi/10.1371/journal.pone.
0002224.
53 MARcy DARNOVSKY, COUNTRIES WITH LAWS OR POLICES ON SEx SELECTION 1-2
(2009), available at http://www.geneticsandsociety.org/downloads/200904_sex-selection_
memo.pdf.
54 See Francine Coeytaux et al., Editorial, Assisted Reproduction and Choice in the Bi-
otech Age: Recommendations for a Way Forward, 83 CONTRACEPfION 1, 2 (2011) ("The
United States, often called the 'Wild West' of assisted reproduction . . . ."); Rebecca Dresser,
Regulating Assisted Reproduction, 30 HASTINGS CENTER. REp. 26, 26 (2000) ("As the twenti-
eth century comes to a close, this country's laissez-faire approach to assisted reproduction is
under attack. References to the 'Wild West' of infertility treatment are common."); Suzanne
Leigh, Reproductive 'Tourism,' USA TODAY, May 3, 2006, at 7D ("But in the USA-dubbed
the Wild West of reproductive technology by bioethicist Arthur Caplan . . . ."); Carole C.
Wegner, Who's the Sherriffin the Wild West ofART?, FERTILTY LAB INSIDER (May 25, 2010),
http://fertilitylabinsider.com/2010/05/wild-wild-west-of-art/. Those who practice medicine in
the fertility industry think that this moniker is inaccurate. The American Society for Repro-
ductive Medicine argues that ART is "one of [the] most highly regulated of all medical prac-
tices in the United States." Am. Soc'Y FOR RjPROD. MiED., OVERSIGHT oF, AssIsTED
REPRoDucTIVE TECHNOLOGY 3 (2010), available at http://www.asrm.org/uploadedFiles/Con-
tent/AboutUs/Media-andPublicAffairs/OversiteOfART%20%282%29.pdf [hereinafter
Oversight of ART].
55 See Assisted Hum. Reprod. Act, S.C. 2004, c. 2, § 7(1) (Can.); G. Pascal Zachary, A
Most Unlikely Industry Finds it Can't Resist Globalization's Call-Exporting Human Sperm is
a Fast-Growth Business, Banks in Denmark, U.S. Find, WALL ST. J., Jan. 7, 2000, at BI
(noting the decrease in the sale of British sperm and the increase in the sale of sperm in
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is legal. 5 6 Some states ban commercial surrogacy,57 but others, Califor-
nia 58 being a prominent example and Illinois becoming more well-known
for its surrogacy industry,59 welcome and support the surrogacy business.
No state or federal law specifically prevents single or gay people from
using ART; in fact, a person discriminated against in such a manner may
be able to sue a healthcare provider for unlawful discrimination, at least
in California.60 No state or federal law bans the practice of PGD.61
While Pennsylvania legislates against sex-selective abortion, 62 there are
no similar statutes that would make a person civilly or criminally liable
for choosing not to transfer embryos of a specific sex, especially when it
is done for the purpose of avoiding disease.
For different reasons, the actors in scenario 5, the Indian couple
coming to the United States to engage in sex-selection for the purpose of
expressing a son preference, might raise red flags for many fertility prov-
iders in the United States who find acceding to such preferences ethically
troubling.63 Other clinics, however, advertise their sex selection services
to foreign travelers determined to avoid laws at home, aimed at eliminat-
ing sex selection practices based on preference rather than concerns for
sex-linked disease or disability, so this couple would likely find someone
to help them get their boy.M The actors in the other scenarios, however,
would find satisfaction somewhere in the United States, thus establishing
that legal impediments are a significant reason for CBFC.
Denmark in part because of "tighter government regulations" in the former country and "lib-
eral regulations" in the latter).
56 See DEBORA SPAR, THEu BAny BusINEss: How MONEY, ScENcE, AND Poirnes DRIVE
THE COMMERCE OF1 CONCEIlON 46 (2006).
57 See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS §722.859 (2009).
58 See, e.g., CAL.. FAM. CODE § 7600 et seq. (West 2004).
59 See Nara Schoenberg, Born in the USA, CHI, TRIBUNE (Apr. 13, 2011), http://articles.
chicagotribune.com/2011-04-13/health/ct-news-surrogate-mom-20 110413_Ilsurrogacy-
center-for-surrogate-parenting-intemational-parents (describing the growing international sur-
rogacy business in Illinois).
60 See N. Coast Women's Care Med. Grp., Inc. v. Superior Court, 189 P.3d 959, 965
(Cal. 2008) (holding that a medical practice that refused to perform artificial insemination for a
lesbian based on religious objections violated California's anti-discrimination law).
61 There is some argument to be made that PGD might be classified as research on em-
bryos, which is banned in some states. However, given the frequency with which the tech-
nique is being used, and the time frame, it is unlikely that it can fairly be classified as an
experimental technique.
62 See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3204(c) (West 2000) ("No abortion which is sought
solely because of the sex of the unborn child shall be deemed a necessary abortion.").
63 See Ethics Comm. of the Am. Soc'y for Reprod. Med., Preconception Gender Selec-
tion for Nonmedical Reasons, 75 FERTiITY & STTERILrry 861, 861-62 (2001).
6 See id. By contrast, the Fertility Institutes, with offices in Los Angeles, New York,
and Mexico, prominently advertises the availability of sex selection through PGD to couples
from all over the world. See Sex Selection and Family Balancing, FERwi-ITfY INsT., http://
www.fertility-docs.com/fertility-gender.phtml (last visited Apr. 10, 2011).
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Wild West label notwithstanding, this Article would be remiss if it
failed to note that the formal legality of the desired act in each scenario
does not guarantee that each of these would-be-travelers will find a way
to satisfy their procreative desires in the United States. This is especially
true for scenario 1, in which the woman seeking CBFC desires to engage
in a procreative act that raises serious ethical and medical concerns even
if there is no relevant law banning the desired act. That scenario-which
involves a post-menopausal would-be mother, an attempt to create a
child in the context of what would be an incestuous relationship if it
involved coital reproduction, and a desire for posthumous reproduction
(albeit with the consent and blessing of the dead party)-would almost
certainly ask more of a potential pregnancy facilitator than she would be
willing to give. The lack of legal impediments means that fertility prov-
iders, frequently with some measure of guidance from professional agen-
cies, must decide what to do when faced with a would-be patient whose
choices are troubling in some way. 6 5 Thus, even in the absence of legal
rules, it is doubtful that the woman in scenario I would leave the United
States having fulfilled her desires.
Though significant, illegality is just one motive for fertility travel.
Other motives include money or the search for cheaper care,66 lack of
technology in the home country,67 and long waiting lists in the home
country. 68 For the reasons described in the preceding paragraphs, from
65 The American Society for Reproductive Medicine (ASRM) provides several ethics
opinions to guide practice among its members. See, e.g., Ethics Comm. of the Am. Soc'y for
Reprod. Med., Access to Fertility Treatment by Gays, Lesbians, and Unmarried Persons, 92
FERTILrrY & STERIIrrY 1190, 1190 (2009); Ethics Comm. of the Am. Soc'y for Reprod. Med.,
Child-rearing Ability and the Provision of Fertility Services, 92 FEWRILITY &SERIrry 864,
864 (2009); Ethics Comm. of the Am. Soc'y for Reprod, Med., Posthumous Reproduction, 82
FERTILrry & STRIITry S260, S262 (2004).
66 For instance, surrogacy in the United States might cost as much as $40,000-$120,000.
Lorraine Ali & Raina Kelley, The Curious Lives of Surrogates, NEWSWEEK, Apr. 7, 2008, at
44. The cost of such an arrangement in India, however, might be as low as $12,000. Abigail
Haworth, Surrogate Mothers: Womb for Rent, MARIE CLAIRE (July 29, 2007), http://
www.marieclaire.com/world-reports/news/surrogate-mothers-india. By contrast, in the United
Kingdom, commercial surrogacy is banned. See Surrogacy Arrangements Act 1985, c. 49, § 2
(U.K.).
67 ART is not widely available in countries without relatively advanced health care sys-
tems. According to the World Health Organization, "[m]ost of those who suffer from infertil-
ity live in developing countries where infertility services in general, and ART in particular, are
not available." Forward, in CURRENT PRACTICES AND CONTROVERSIES IN Assis rED REPRO-
oUCTION: REPORT OF A ME~TING ON "MEI)icAL, ErHICAL AND SoCIAL ASPECTS oF AssisTED
REPRODUCIlON" HELD AT WHO HEADQUARTERS IN GENEVA, Swrl-ERLAND 17-21 SEPTEMBER
2001, at xv, xv (Effy Vayena et al. eds., 2002); see also Robert D. Nachtigall, International
Disparities in Access to Infertility Services, 85 FERTILIfY & STERn ITY 871, 873 (2006) ("Of
the 191 member states of the WHO, only 48 have medical facilities that offer IVF.")
68 Where the pool of gamete providers or surrogates is small, sometimes as a direct
consequence of specific types of restrictive regulation, a person seeking pregnancy might need
to leave her home country in order to get access to the tools that she needs to procreate. See
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waiting lists to discrimination to missing technology, people seek CBFC.
The reputation that the United States has earned as a nation with wide
accessibility to high-quality fertility care, for those who can afford the
equally high price tag that accompanies such care, has made it a popular
travel destination for those in search of such care. This phenomenon
raises questions about whether movement of this type is good for those
who travel, for the countries from which they leave and to which they
will return, or for the country that welcomes their business, in this case
the United States.
I. SHOULD PEOPLE TRAVEL TO MAKE BABIES? THE LEGAL AND
ETHICAL DILEMMAS OF CBFC
"Cross-border reproductive care represents an urgent
and challenging issue to tackle from medical, legal,
psychologic [sic], and ethical perspectives. "69
The previous section considered why people travel for ART. This
section considers the more ethereal notion of whether they should travel
for such care and the relationships between such travel and the state. The
discussion in this part deals with the reality that subsumed under the
rubric of the second question are a number of complicated inquiries. Do
people have a right to have children with the use of technology and, if so,
what is the nature of that right? Do nations have any obligation to facili-
tate, or at least not hinder, the procreative desires of their citizens or
Leigh, supra note 54. In the United Kingdom, where eggs cannot be sold anonymously and
where those sellers can only be reimbursed for their services and not paid a fee, the wait to
purchase eggs can be as long as one to two years. Anonymity, 87 FERTILIY & STERILIfY S33,
S33 (2007). Many older women, whose chances of pregnancy with their own eggs are greatly
diminished, feel a strong push to leave the United Kingdom in order to purchase eggs. Sarah
Boseley, NHS Restrictions Prompt Fertility Tourism Boom, GUARDIAN (June 30, 2009), http://
www.guardian.co.uk/society/2009/jun/29/women-over-40-fertility-tourism ("Hundreds of wo-
men over the age of 40 are travelling to fertility clinics in Europe to try to get pregnant because
NHS clinics in the UK will not take them, the first-ever Europe-wide study of fertility tourism
shows."). Similarly, Canada made it illegal to pay men for their sperm or women for ova in a
2004 law called the Assisted Human Reproduction Act. See Assisted Hum. Reprod. Act, S.C.
2004, c. 2, § 7(1) (Can.) ("No person shall purchase, offer to purchase or advertise for the
purchase of sperm or ova from a donor or a person acting on behalf of a donor."). As such, the
number of men in the country willing to sell their sperm dropped precipitously. In short order,
all of the agencies that formerly sold sperm closed their doors save for one. See Anonymous
Sperm Donation Needed Fertility Experts, CANADIAN PRESs (Oct. 27, 2010), http://www.ctv.
ca/CTVNews/Health/20101027/sperm-donation-caanda-101027/. One 2010 newspaper article
reported that there were only forty sperm sellers available in all of Canada. Id. Gaia Bernstein
provides a more comprehensive review of the link between loss of anonymity in sperm dona-
tion and shortages in men willing to sell sperm. See Gaia Bernstein, Essay, Regulating Repro-
ductive Technologies: Timing, Uncertainty, and Donor Anonymity, 90 B.U. L. REv. 1189,
1206 (2010).
69 Petra Thorn & Sandra Dill, The Role of Patients' Organizations in Cross-Border Re-
productive Care, 94 FERTILIfY & STERx.rY e23, e24 (2010).
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those who are not their citizens? Does the status of a nation, developing
or developed, matter in evaluating the question of control over procrea-
tive practices? Are there some procreative practices or potential parents
that the state should sanction and others that it should shun? If so, on
what basis would such decisions be made? This part discusses all of
these questions and concludes that a right to procreate with ART does
exist as a United States constitutional matter and as a matter of human
rights. From there, it concludes, as a matter of law and ethics, that na-
tions should avoid impeding procreative desires in most circumstances,
and that justice demands a careful accounting in circumstance in which
authorities make the call to block access to such care.
A. What is Not at Stake
Many of the concerns raised about how people seeking CBFC will
use ART are general concerns about ART as a practice and are not spe-
cific to those who travel to use ART. There is a strong movement in the
United States for greater regulation of the fertility industry based on a
number of general concerns about ART use and practice.7 0 For instance,
objections to the commodification of children7 ' or the degradation of wo-
men's bodies or women's labor as part of ART72 are in no way confined
to CBFC.73
When Professor Lisa Ikemoto asserts in an article about CBFC that
ART is a "gendered technology" that "allocates most of the health risks
to women," this is a claim that is endemic to ART and not one that is
rooted in who, in terms of citizenship, is using ART or the geographic
location of its use.74 When it comes to objections to the disproportionate
70 See, e.g., CAHN, supra note 7, at 190-93 (Cahn argues for greater regulation due to
concerns about the market that are rooted in issues of the commodification of gametes, the
complications of familial relationships created through ART, and issues of identity for children
born with the assistance of technology); Carbone, supra note 7, at 109.
71 See, e.g., GENA COREA, THE MOTHER MACHINE: REPRODUCIIVE TECHNOLOGIEs FROM
ARIFICIAL INSEMINATION To ARTIFICIAL WOM13S 93 (1985) ("And I wonder this: when babies
are turned into consumer products, who oversees quality control?").
72 See, e.g., DEBRA SA7, WHY SOME THINGS SHOULD NCY BiE FOR SALIE: THE MORAL
Limns oF MARKETs 128 (2010) (arguing that in our society contracts for pregnancy "will turn
women's labor into something that is used and controlled by others and will reinforce gender
stereotypes that have been used to justify the unequal status of women.").
73 See Lisa C. Ikemoto, Reproductive Tourism: Equality Concerns in the Global Market
for Fertility Services, 27 L. & INEQ. 277, 303-04 (2009).
74 Id. at 303. Ikemoto refers specifically to egg donation and surrogacy, each of which
has risks for women, some of which can be dire, including infertility or death for the gamete
provider or surrogate. See id. While I agree in part with Ikemoto's characterization, I am not
convinced that it is completely accurate across the total range of ART uses. First, I reject that
notion that technology has a gender; so, to the extent that this is her claim, I do not find that
claim to be accurate or useful. While technologies may be used on one sex versus another, I
would not ascribe gender, the social construction, to technologies that have meaning only in
the context of how they are wielded by and understood by human beings. In this sense, tech-
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physical impact of many technologies of reproduction-which necessa-
rily require the presence of a uterus-a surrogate in India feels those
impacts just as a surrogate in California feels them. When commentators
flag concerns about ART being a technology reserved largely for those
with economic privilege,75 this truth cuts across a variety of geographic
contexts. Therefore, there is nothing more pernicious about having a
baby through ART in the United States who will be raised elsewhere,
than there is about having a baby through ART who will remain in the
United States. In fact, these concerns have been a consistent and con-
stant part of the academic and popular conversation about ART for
decades. 76
This is not the say that broader concerns about how ART is used
and by whom are illegitimate or should play no part in shaping future
conversations about ART regulation in the United States. Rather, the
point is that these concerns are not new or unique in the context of
CBFC. If one pursued the idea of treating people seeking CBFC in a
different manner than native users, there would need to be some plausi-
ble claim that there is something different about people seeking CBFC
that warrants more stringent control or even prohibition as contrasted
with how native users access or utilize the technology. Some possibili-
nology itself is neutral and the problem is with us and not with it. This Article makes this
point only to be clear that the root of our concerns about ART is not a dispute with inanimate
objects. Rather, it is a dispute with people and the ways in which our society gives meaning to
technology. Second, I worry a bit about her characterization that "[r]egardless of the cause of
infertility, it is the woman who is seen as infertile." Id. at 294. This assertion seems to flow
from an ART narrative that focuses on heterosexual couples to the exclusion of considering
that same-sex couples, male or female, frequently enter this market without the weight of
medical infertility existing as part of the narrative of resort to technology. In these cases, I do
not think it is accurate to proclaim that the narrative of the female body as the primary site of
infertility is paramount.
75 See Liza Mundy, A Special Kind of Poverty; The Poor Get Used to Going Without.
But Going Without a Baby is Hard to Get Used to, WASH. PosTr, Apr. 20, 2003, at W08
(describing economic barriers to accessing ART); M.M. Peterson, Assisted Reproductive Tech-
nologies and Equity of Access Issues, 31 J. MuD. Errmcs 280, 280 (2005) (describing the
problem of unequal access to ART in Australia).
76 As explained by Jennifer Parks, some radical feminists "have argued that reproductive
technologies serve to oppress and subordinate women, that they are the final frontier for the
patriarchal usurpation of women's reproductive role, and that these technologies have turned
women's bodies into sites for dangerous experimentation and research." Jennifer Parks, Re-
thinking Radical Politics in the Context of Assisted Reproductive Technology, 23 BIOETHICS
20, 20 (2009). See e.g., THE BABY MACHINE (Jocelynne A. Scutt ed., 1988) (offering a series
of essays in which authors give voice to the claim that reproductive technology does not free
women from oppression, but rather enhances and reinforces it while moving women further
away from equality); COREA, supra note 71 (arguing that the fertility industry is rooted in
patriarchy and that it reproduces and reinforces systems that oppress and exploit all women,
especially poor women).
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ties for differences that might serve as the basis for disparate treatment
appear in a later part of this discussion.77
A starting pointing for thinking about CBFC in the United States is
analyzing how it differs from medical travel in general or from travel for
CBFC in other countries. In this vein, an interesting element of general
medical travel, and the academic writing about such tourism, is that it
often focuses on people who travel from developed nations to developing
nations for the purpose of accessing healthcare that is comparable in
quality, but substantially cheaper in price than the care provided in the
traveler's country of origin.78 The concerns raised about this kind of
travel generally focus on issues such as whether the quality of care is in
fact comparable,79 what legal remedies an individual might have if a
practitioner in a foreign country commits medical malpractice,80 and
whether the resource allocation to support medical travel has unaccept-
able consequences for the overall quality of medical care in a developing
nation."'
Specifically in the context of people traveling for fertility care,
Richard Storrow adds another worry, which is that:
[L]ocal laws that purport to outlaw socially irresponsible
forms of procreation have extraterritorial effects that vio-
late the spirit of those same laws. By importing oppres-
sion in the form of infertile individuals who travel
abroad to exercise what they perceive to be their repro-
ductive rights in the destination country in ways that op-
press women there, these laws turn public oppression in
one country into private oppression in another. 82
7 See discussion infra Part III.
78 See John Connell, Medical Tourism: Sea, Sun, Sand and . . . Surgery, 27 ToURISM
MGMT. 1093, 1094 (2006); Leigh Turner, 'First World Health Care at Third World Prices':
Globalization, Bioethics and Medical Tourism, 2 BioSocIETIEs 303, 312-13 (2007); Diane
York, Medical Tourism: The Trend Toward Outsourcing Medical Procedures to Foreign
Countries, 28 J. CoNrINUINo EDUC. IN THE HEALer PROFS 99, 100 (2008).
79 This concern has been raised specifically in the context of CBFC. See Trish Davies,
Cross-border Reproductive Care: Quality and Safety Challenges for the Regulator, 94 FERrIH-
rrY & STERijIITY e20, e20 (2010) ("The lack of international standards allows practices re-
stricted in one country to be carried out in another, where quality and safety may not be
equivalent.").
80 See Nathan Cortez, Recalibrating the Legal Risks of Cross-Border Health Care, 10
YALE J. HEALTH Pot 'y L. & EiHICS 1, 3-4 (2010).
81 See Priya Shetty, Medical Tourism Booms in India, but at What Cost?, 376 LANCET
671, 672 (2010) ("Increasingly, Indian doctors are worried about how gearing the health care
system towards rich foreign patients will affect the care of India's millions of impoverished
people.").
82 Richard F. Storrow, Quests for Conception: Fertility Tourists, Globalization and Fem-
inist Legal Theory, 57 HASTINGs L.J. 295, 329 (2005).
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Storrow elaborates on this point by using the example of purchasing eggs
for use in IVF.83 When a developed nation limits the available market in
anonymous egg purchases, buyers will make those purchases in countries
with more favorable laws. These same countries may also have large
populations of impoverished or economically fragile women with few
opportunities for economic stability for whom the sale of eggs, a process
that entails some physical risks for the seller,84 is far more attractive than
it might otherwise be.85 Storrow points specifically to economically
fragile women from Eastern European countries like Romania who sell
their eggs to clients from wealthier and economically stable countries. 86
However, Storrow's concern about the exploitation of women who live
in precarious economic positions, echoed by others,87 does not consider
how, if at all, one should evaluate travel from one wealthy economy to
another wealthy economy, or from a less developed economy to a more
developed economy.88
Arguably, the depth of concern about substandard healthcare, mis-
placed public health expenditures, and the exploitation of native popula-
tions are either irrelevant or substantially less relevant in the context of
people traveling to the United States for ART. First, the United States is
a world leader in providing ART, and there are significant practices in
83 See id. at 327.
84 See Helen Pearson, Health Effects of Egg Donation May Take Decades to Emerge,
442 NATURE 607, 607 (2006) (describing the unknown risks of ovarian stimulation with fertil-
ity drugs that are used for harvesting ova).
85 As an example, restrictions on ART in some European countries have spurred "Euro-
pean reproductive travel on a massive scale, either to less restrictive Western European coun-
tries such as Spain . . . or to the 'white' post-Soviet bloc of Eastern Europe (e.g., countries
such as Russia, Czech Republic, and Romania)." Inhorn & Patrizio, supra note 8, at 905. In
these countries, young women "may comprise a vulnerable population of egg donors, who are
compelled out of economic necessity to sell their ova in the local reproductive marketplace."
Id.
86 See Storrow, supra note 82, at 327.
87 See, e.g., B.C. Heng, The Advent of International 'Mail-Order' Egg Donation, 113
BJOG 1225, 1225-26 (2006).
88 Storrow considers the parallels between those who seek CBFC and sex tourists, a link
that draws the mind to something nefarious in a way that he likely does not intend, but other
scholars agree that this link between sex tourism and CBFC is valid. See Storrow, supra note
82, at 317; Inhom & Patrizio, supra note 8, at 905 ("Given the newly recognized category of
the 'traveling foreign egg donor' who seeks economic mobility through the sale of her body
parts . . .unregulated fertility tourism has been compared with sex tourism, as young women in
the economically deteriorated post-socialist societies discover that prostitution and egg dona-
tion offer economic rewards."). Storrow also compares fertility travelers to those who travel
abroad to adopt a child, perhaps a more apt analogy in that it involves a quest for parenthood,
but one that also does not entirely fit with the reality of CBFC. See Storrow, supra note 82, at
320-22. As just one mark of difference, the available descriptions of systematic abuse of the
rights of birth mothers in some developing nations, see, e.g., David M. Smolin, The Two Faces
of Intercountry Adoption: The Significance of the Indian Adoption Scandals, 35 SEroN HALL
L. REV. 403, 404 (2005), are substantially more documented than harms to those who are
participants in the gamete market in the United States. See Storrow, supra note 82, at 320-21.
WELCOME TO THE WILD WEST
place to evaluate and elevate the quality of fertility care being provided
to patients in this country.89 While there are many aspects of the indus-
try that are not closely regulated-such as the price of gametes that are
sold, the characteristics of people who can act as surrogates, or the paren-
tal abilities of those who seek to create children-the actual providing of
medical care is regulated by the same system that regulates all medical
care in this country.90 This means that physicians who work in this field
are licensed to practice medicine and are in good standing with the rele-
vant licensing and professional societies.91 Where an injury happens,
there is a robust medical malpractice system in place to respond to fail-
ures to adhere to an appropriate standard of care.9 2 There is some
amount of medical screening of those who sell gametes, especially
sperm.9 3 There is a system of professional self-regulation that, while
neither perfect nor binding, provides standards for how physicians and
laboratories should provide care. 9 4 Furthermore, the laboratories used to
store gametes and provide a range of services, including fertilizing eggs
outside of the body, must be licensed and inspected to ensure a minimum
level of competence among personnel and to adequately maintain the
facilities.9 5 It is hard to make an argument that the quality of care might
be lacking in the United States. Therefore, this general medical travel
concern is no reason to discourage people from traveling to the United
States.
Furthermore, the availability of the tort system to redress wrongs
where there is an injury caused by a provider's negligence, also makes
the concern about redress of injuries irrelevant in the context of people
89 Oversight of Art, supra note 54, at 4 (describing the web of state, federal, and profes-
sional regulation of the fertility industry).
90 As noted in an admittedly self-serving, but still accurate, report from the American
Society of Reproductive Medicine:
As with all medical practice in the United States, safety in reproductive
medicine is assured by a combination of state and federal government regulation and
professional self-regulation that includes facility accreditation and practitioner certi-
fication. On the state level, there is a strict physician licensure system. On the
federal level, several agencies enforce standards and practices designed to protect
public health and safety. Several national groups accredit laboratories as well. In
the realm of professional self-regulation, an on-going system of quality assurance
includes specialty training and certification of physicians, accreditation of clinics




92 See id. at 5.
93 See FDA, supra note 27.
94 See Oversight of ART, supra note 54, at 4.
95 See FDA, supra note 93.
2012] 369
370 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 22:349
traveling to the United States for treatment. 96 Moreover, to the extent
that there is any relevance to the concern about access to legal redress,
that relevance emanates from a broader critique of the United States'
medical malpractice system and is not related specifically to the use of
ART in general or the use of ART by those seeking CBFC. Although
there may be barriers to accessing the legal system, such as a need to
return to one's home country or a lack of financial resources, the struc-
ture for seeking a legal response exists.
Finally, while there are many reasons to think that the United
States' healthcare system is deeply flawed, including the dearth of medi-
cal students who choose to enter the field of primary care, 97 the problems
of the system are not caused or deepened by a glut of people seeking to
practice specialized fertility treatment to the detriment of other necessary
areas of medical care.
The final concern, that of exploitation of people in developing na-
tions by citizens of developed nations, will be explored in-depth in other
parts of this Article. 98 Nevertheless, if it is the case that most of the
standard concerns about medical travel are wholly irrelevant, or at least
less relevant in the context of CBFC provided in the United States, there
are other reasons why some would object to the idea of people traveling
to the United States for CBFC. Those potential objections are manifold
and may be aimed at very different populations of ART users.
B. Procreation as a Right and as a Component of Justice
The arguments in the sections that follow rest upon the notion that
procreation is a right as a matter of United States constitutional law,99
and as a matter of human rights' 00 and ethics. That right, it has been
argued, extends to a right to use assisted reproduction.' 0 This Article
96 One place where this may not be completely true is in the context of wrongful life
claims, which are seldom allowed in the United States, but might be available in other coun-
tries. See, eg. Smith v. Cote, 513 A.2d 341, 347-48, 355 (N.H. 1986) (holding that parents of
a child born with various disabling conditions could sue for wrongful birth, but that the child
had no cause of action for wrongful life).
97 See Editorial, Bolster Primary Care: Avert a Physician Shortage, AM. M-1. Nrws
(Jan. 5, 2009), http://www.ama-assn.orglamednews/2009/01/05/edsa0I05.htm.
98 See discussion infra Part 11.D.
99 See Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
oo See, e.g., INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON Civil, AND POLITICAL RIGHTs 112, available
at http://www.dfa.ie/uploads/documents/Political%20Division/iccprfinalpdf.pdf, which pro-
vides, "tn]o one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, fam-
ily, home or correspondence . . . ." The Covenant also holds that "[t]he family is the natural
and fundamental group unit of society and is entitled to protection by society and the State
.... The right of men and women of marriageable age to marry and to found a family shall be
recognized." Id. at 132.
101 See, e.g., T. Tinnsjo, Our Right to In Vitro Fertilisation-Its Scope and Limits, 34 J.
MED. ETHICS 802, 802 (2008) (arguing that the right to procreate encompasses a right to use
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will not engage in a defense of the right to procreate with ART, but will
assume the existence of such a right for the purposes of the analysis of
CBFC. The notion of rights espoused here is one rooted in the idea of
reproductive justice, which means that the procreative right is not simply
about choice and autonomy, though reproductive autonomy is crucial and
the choice it allows is significant.102 Rather, it is a right tempered by
concerns about equality, community, and intersectionality.1 03 Therefore,
though a person has a right to procreate,lO4 and may access technology in
order to bring that right to fruition, the discussion that follows does not
see that right as a complete trump to notions of responsibility to future
children, to the society in which those children will live, or to the indi-
viduals who participate in the market for the building blocks of babies. 05
A balanced discussion of ART as practiced across borders must ac-
knowledge "there are political ramifications of citizens crossing borders
to receive treatments deemed illegal or restricted in their homeland. Re-
spect for individual autonomy as well as respect for political and social
value systems should be considered."10 6 The tangible and intangible
ramifications of these decisions may be felt in the individual's country of
origin as well as in her destination country. Consequently, there is no
doubt that countries can and will come to their own conclusions about
how to deal with citizens who access CBFC and then return to their na-
tive countries to give birth to and raise those children. Some countries
have already identified CBFC as a problem that they wish to solve. 07
Turkey, for instance, has taken drastic measures to stem the flow of its
citizens seeking CBFC.108 The country has long made surrogacy and
IVF and various embryo screening technologies); JOHN A. ROBERTSON, THE FUTURE OF THE
CONSTIUTION: RE-PRODUCrIviE RIGHTS AND REPRODUCTIvE TECHNOLOGY IN 2030, at 5 (Jan.
21, 2011), available at http://www.brookings.edul-/mediaresearch/files/papers/2011/1/21%20
reproductive%20technology%20robertson/0 121 reproductive technology-robertson.pdf (ar-
guing that the United States Constitution protects a broad and fundamental right to access
reproductive technologies).
102 As one author notes, "[b]eing able to decide whether or how to reproduce based on
one's own values is crucial to people's well-being. In other words, having reproductive auton-
omy is crucial." Carolyn McLeod, Editorial, Rich Discussion About Reproductive Autonomy,
23 BrrIrHICS ii, ii (2009).
103 The concept of intersectionality refers to the ways in which intersecting and overlap-
ping identities frequently result in the erasure of the experiences of marginalized communities,
especially, but not limited to, women of color. See, e.g., Kimberld Crenshaw, Mapping the
Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN.
L. Rnv 1241, 1244 (1991).
104 See, e.g., Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541 (1942).
105 For a fuller account of the relationship between reproductive justice and a right to
procreate, see Kimberly M. Mutcherson, Transformative Reproduction 16 J. GENDER RACe &
Jusr. (forthcoming Winter 2013).
106 Nygren et al., supra note 3, at e5.
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egg selling illegal but, even so, an estimated 2,000 to 3,000 women travel
abroad each year to circumvent these rules. 109 The government re-
sponded by passing a regulation under which people who went in search
of CBFC could face prison terms of up to three years if caught upon their
return home.' 10 Additionally, Turkish clinics found to have encouraged
such travel or to have informed individuals of the possibility of CBFC
could face suspension or closure.''
Other countries penalize physicians who publicize information
about where banned services can be accessed abroad,"12 and still other
countries may delay or deny citizenship to the children born in banned or
legally specious arrangements.' 13 Responses of this kind, meant to curb
travel for fertility purposes, have potentially devastating consequences
for the practice of medicine, relationships between providers and pa-
tients, and the stability of familial units.' 14 The concern of this Article,
however, is with how the United States should react to those who travel
here. What nations do to discourage or prevent such travel by their own
citizens is a discussion for another article and should not control deci-
sions made by United States policymakers about how this nation should
think about CBFC." 5
Focusing then on arguments to be made about the United States as a
destination for CBFC, this Article assumes that no one would seriously
argue strictly in economic terms about protecting access to market trans-
actions that lead to the creation of human beings. Praising the efficiency
of markets without reference to the unique context of making children
fails to capture what makes this slice of medical travel particularly wor-
109 See id.
I 10 See id.
III Id.
112 See Fineschi et al., supra note 29, at 537.
I 13 See, e.g., Denis Campbell, Couples Who Pay Surrogate Mothers Could Lose Right to
Raise the Child, GUARDIAN (Apr. 5, 2010, 2:40 PM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2010/apr/
05/surrogacy-parents-ivf.
1 14 For instance, in the well-publicized Baby Manji case, a child born to an Indian gesta-
tional surrogate, pursuant to a contract with Japanese intended parents, was left in legal limbo
after her intended parents divorced prior to her birth. See KARI Poirrs, TEACHING No1Es:
COMMERCIAL SURROGACY AND FERTILHfY TOURISM IN INDIA: THE CASE OF BABY MANJI 5
(2009), available at http://kenan.ethics.duke.edu/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/Case-Study-Sur-
rogacy-notes.pdf. Japanese law recognizes only a birth mother as a legal mother; therefore
Baby Manji's father could not secure a Japanese passport for her. Id. He also could not secure
a legal tie to her through Indian law because that body of law did not recognize him as a legal
father despite his being the genetic father, and he could not adopt the child because the law
forbids adoptions of baby girls by single men. Id.
115 1. Glenn Cohen has extensively explored the question of how home nations should
respond to what he calls "circumvention tourism," meaning travel to avoid prohibitions on
certain health procedures in a home country. See Cohen; supra note 11, at 1312. His conclu-
sions about how home countries should respond are not necessarily relevant to how a destina-
tion country should respond to such acts. See id. at 1336.
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thy of study.' 16 Traveling to see impressive landmarks or even traveling
for a beauty enhancing cosmetic procedure is different in kind and char-
acter from traveling for serious medical care, especially care that, if suc-
cessful, will result in the birth of a child. This is not to say that the
fertility industry is not a business through which billions of dollars flow
per year, because it most certainly is.117 However, it is also a business
that requires a careful understanding of the basic building blocks of fam-
ily, kinship, and intimate obligation.
A second argument that this Article does not pursue with vigor is
the claim that the actual implementation of a rule that distinguishes be-
tween native ART users and people seeking CBFC would be so unwieldy
to enforce so as to essentially be unenforceable and therefore not worth
attempting to implement. This may be true on some important levels.
For example, would fertility providers be required to ask for identity pa-
pers from all clients, or only those who speak with foreign accents?
Would people be held at the border if they indicate that they are entering
the United States for an appointment with a fertility provider? Would it
matter whether the goal in coming to the United States was to have an
actual procedure done versus seeking consultation? What if one member
of a couple was a United States citizen? It is possible that issues of this
nature would be so vexing that lawmaking would seem ineffective. Even
so, the larger question of whether we should stop or discourage these
individuals from coming allows us to engage in an analysis, as a matter
of law and ethics, of the core issues inherent in a discussion about poten-
tially controlling or limiting access to the tools for creating babies.
Given that many of the big concerns about medical travel generally
do not apply to the United States, those who object to such travel need to
1 16 With some notable exceptions, see, e.g., Hon. Richard A. Posner, The Ethics and Eco-
nomics of Enforcing Contracts of Surrogate Motherhood, 5 J. CON'MP. HEALH L. & Pot'xY
21, 21-22 (1989) (arguing for the enforcement of surrogacy contracts based, in part, on an
economic model of the benefits of contract enforcement), most of those who write about legal
and ethical issues surrounding reproductive technology are careful to avoid the perception that
market principles are the only, or even the primary, principles that should govern law and
policy in this arena. In fact, many scholars, especially, but not exclusively feminist scholars,
find the injection of market principles into this discussion about the creation of new life to be
one of the most objectionable consequences of the business of making babies. See, e.g., Mar-
garet Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARv. L. REv. 1849, 1935-36 (1987); Elizabeth
S. Anderson, Is Women's Labor a Commodity?, 19 PHIL. & PuB. AFiF. 71, 80-81 (1990). As
one scholar wrote,
The rules and rhetoric of commerce seem to fail all things reproductive. The events
and choices made along the reproductive continuum resist marketplace classifica-
tion. Their meaning spills over, leaving a residue that is not easily wiped away.
Marketplace terms ("informed parties," "uncoerced choices," "thorough contracts,"
"services," "products") ring anemic here. They do not seem to capture everything
that goes into whether people desire a child or not.
Erika Blacksher, On Ova Commerce, 30 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 29, 30 (2000).
117 See SPAR, supra note 56, at 3.
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find other reasons for their opposition. In responding to these objections,
it is necessary to review two types of arguments. The first type of argu-
ment is rooted in law and legal theory. Unfortunately, like resort to mar-
ket talk, a narrow focus on the law does not capture the full range of
what is important on an individual and societal level in this discussion of
CBFC. This is because law talk, in the arena of reproduction, tends to
focus quite heavily on autonomy and choice.118 This is not surprising
given that our legal system fetishizes the notion of radically autonomous
individuals," 9 but static notions of autonomy are a slippery foundation
upon which to rest conversations about making new human beings.120
This is not to say that autonomy is irrelevant in this context, but the
notion of autonomy sought to be protected in this arena needs to take
account of the shared interests of individuals, future individuals,121 and
the state in a way that is not always as stark in other conversations about
autonomous decision making.122 To take proper account of the range of
vital interests involved in this discussion, this Article draws from the
work of legal scholars, philosophers, and ethicists. Expanding the range
of scholarly discussion provides greater opportunities for thinking about
how decisions about law and legal regimes impact important societal in-
stitutions, such as the family, and how they implicate the worth of indi-
viduals and the importance of human freedom. This Article discusses
arguments from law and ethics, sometimes separately, sometimes to-
gether, and argues that neither set of arguments is persuasive enough to
118 See, e.g., JOHN A. RonIR'soN, CHILDREN OF CHOICE: FREIEDOM AND HE NEw REPRO-
i)ucrivE TECHNOLOGIES 22-25 (1994) (as made clear in Robertson's title, the concept of
choice is central to his arguments about reproduction and the right to use ART).
1 19 See, e.g., Martha Minow, "Forming Underneath Everything That Grows:" Toward a
History of Family Law, 1985 Wis. L. REV. 819, 877 (1985) (complicating the relationship
among rights, autonomy, and community in the history of families and family law).
120 See, e.g., JANICE G. RAYMoNo, WOMEN AS WOMBS: REPRODUCTIvE TECHNOLOGIES
AND THE BATiTLE OVER WOMEN'S FREEDOM 76-107 (1993) (critiquing and refuting liberal
arguments about the positive nature of procreative liberty as it pertains to the use of assisted
reproduction); Sarah S. Boone, Slavery and Contract Motherhood: A "Racialized" Objection
to the Autonomy Arguments, in IssuEs IN REPRODUCIVE TECHNOLOGY: AN ANTHOLOGY 349,
357-64 (Helen Bequaert Holmes ed., 1992) (comparing the market for surrogates to the insti-
tution of slavery and, in particular, the exploitation of the reproductive capacities of enslaved
African-American women); JANET L. DoLGIN, DEFINING THE FAMILY: LAW, TECHNOLOGY,
ANi) REPRODUClON IN AN UNEASY AGE 213(1997).
121 The idea that conversations about reproductive technology should include references
to the interests of future people is not without its critics. See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 30, at
426-27. But see Kimberly M. Mutcherson, Response, In Defense of Future Children: A Re-
sponse to Cohen's Beyond Best Interests, 96 MINN. L. REV. 46, 49-50 (2012).
122 See, e.g., Anne Donchin, Autonomy and Interdependence: Quandaries in Genetic De-
cision Making, in RELATIONAL AT.rroNOMY: FEMINIST PERSPECflVES ON AUTONOMY, AGENCY,
AND THE SOCIAL SELF 236, 237-40 (Catriona Mackenzie & Natalie Stoljar eds, 2000) (describ-
ing a notion of strong relational autonomy which is marked by an understanding of the balance
between interdependence and independence, especially in how people are tied together in fa-
milial units).
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actually warrant serious effort to make it more difficult or less attractive
to seek CBFC in the United States.
C. Justice Concerns: Who Has the Right to Procreate?
A broad argument against CFBC is that the United States should not
be a literal breeding ground for people whose home countries have deter-
mined that it is inappropriate for them to use ART, either because of who
they are or because of what they would like to do with the technology.
Part of that argument rests on the idea that travelers have a moral obliga-
tion to obey the law of their home countries no matter where they are.
We can reject this idea with relative ease in some cases, but it may be
harder to reject in others. As Professor Guido Pennings notes, while
there may be a "prima facie obligation of citizens to obey national law"
there "is a wealth of precedence in reproductive healthcare, i.e. termina-
tion of pregnancy, sterilization and contraception" in which individuals,
especially women, flee their home countries to obtain care.123 Women
from a long list of countries, from Spain to Ireland, have fled their homes
to access various reproductive healthcare denied to them on their own
soil.124
A woman who left Ireland to have an early second trimester abor-
tion in New Jersey would not be denied access to that heavily contested,
but still legal, medical procedure in the United States. In fact, many
would defend and praise the United States' willingness to allow a woman
access to abortion, birth control, or sterilization services that are banned
or criminalized in her home country, thereby affirming both women's
rights to make decisions about their bodies and a broader right to deter-
mine their destinies by controlling their reproductive decisions. As a his-
123 See Pennings et al., ESHRE supra note 9, at 2182. For instance, in 2009, just under
4,500 women traveled to the United Kingdom from Ireland to have abortions-a drop from
6,500 women in 2001. See Marie O'Halloran, Abortion Travel Numbers to UK Fall, IRISH-
TIMES.COM (July 7, 2010), http://www.irishtimes.com/newspaper/breaking/2010/0722/break-
ing55.html.
124 As one commentator explained, "[i]n Spain, we have a lot of experience with such
reproductive exile: when oral contraceptives were banned, Spanish women acquired them in
France; when termination of pregnancy was illegal, they went to England." Roberto Matorras,
Letters to the Editor, Reproductive Exile Versus Reproductive Tourism, 20 Hum. Rr.PRoo.
3571, 3571 (2005). According to a 2010 report issued by Human Rights Watch on abortion
access in Ireland:
Abortion is legally restricted in almost all circumstances, except where the pregnant
woman's life is in danger. Even in those rare circumstances where an abortion can
be legally performed, it appears that it almost never happens. Despite interviewing a
number of prominent obstetricians and physicians, Human Rights Watch was unable
to document a single case where an abortion had been legally performed in Ireland.
As a result, all women living on Irish soil are forced to travel to access a medical
procedure.
A State of Isolation: Access to Abortion for Women in Ireland, Hum. RIGHs WATCH (Jan. 28,
2010), http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2010/01/28/state-isolation.
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torical matter, differing rules on abortion are credited as "the first cause
of migration in the field of reproduction."l 2 5
In circumstances where the care sought outside of the home juris-
diction is of the type thought to be well within the parameters of accept-
able healthcare in many parts of the world, condemning people to follow
the precepts of their home nations while abroad would perpetuate an al-
ready dismal set of circumstances for the affected individuals. Circum-
venting such rules can be praised as an important act of defiance or even
civil disobedience to the extent that an individual refuses to be bound by
a legal code that would deny her the opportunity to express the full ex-
tent of her human freedom. It may be easier to see this link in the con-
text of terminating an unwanted pregnancy or getting access to
contraception that will aid in preventing pregnancy, but similar argu-
ments can be made in the context of pregnancy creation. 126
Where a country denies access to tools of procreation and family
expansion on the basis of invidious discrimination, such as sexual orien-
tation, the United States should proudly open its borders to those who
would circumvent such rules. Allowing CBFC is akin to providing a
platform for people to play out political objections to the restrictive and
discriminatory rules in their home countries. Certainly most people who
travel to access ART will not think of themselves as making a political
statement; they will instead be focused on building their families. But
when they do build those families and go back home to live, their very
presence facilitates the process of breaking down the restrictions that
drove them from their home in the first place. To the extent that our
open fertility borders play a role in helping to dismantle unfairly discrim-
inatory structures in other countries, a decision not to restrict access to
fertility care is an important policy choice. Of course, it is possible that
those who leave their home country will only be the elite whose depar-
ture actually saps political will for a change. This is a risk, no doubt, but
the possibilities of transformation by virtue of acknowledged resort to
CBFC are not insignificant.
Similarly, one might also argue in this context that the United States
has an interest in acting to protect procreation and family building across
a wide spectrum as a human right. The difficulty of this argument is
similar to the difficulty that comes in the domestic context when one tries
to make sense of whether ART is a constitutional right that emanates
from the fundamental right to procreate.127 A person skeptical of ART
125 See Ferraretti et al., supra note 21, at 262.
126 See, e.g., Zakiya Luna, From Rights to Justice: Women of Color Changing the Face of
US Reproductive Rights Organizing, 4 Sociuims WrrHour BORDERs 343, 361 (2009).
127 For decades, John Robertson has advocated for a constitutional right to procreate
broad enough to encompass the use of ART by married and single people. See, e.g., John A.
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as a form of human procreation might question whether access to ART is
a human right that warrants sufficient respect, and whether it should be
made available to people who cross borders for the specific purpose of
using ART. Unlike traveling across borders to get life-saving care, trav-
eling for ART is about access to a type of care that can be conceptualized
quite differently. ART does not cure disease or disability necessarily.
Rather, it finds a way around that disease or disability. For people who
are using ART because they have no partner or because their partner is of
the same sex, ART may not have any connection to an infirmity of the
body that needs to be fixed, so a rationale of alleviating disease or disa-
bility is inapposite. Instead, one has to root the importance of ART in a
belief that access to family formation and procreation are significant
enough that those who seek those things through technology should be
welcomed.
Under this belief, open fertility borders speak to a larger desire to
expand rather than restrict the definition of family, a process that for
some is proceeding at a slower pace than they would like, while for
others it is proceeding too rapidly-nonetheless the process is moving
forward. As states slowly grind their way to greater openness and in-
clusivity for diverse family structures as well as broader understandings
of how children's best interests can be served, shutting our borders to
individuals similarly inclined to embrace this kind of expansion is a re-
gressive move. Open fertility borders express a belief in expanding
rather than constricting the available options for those who would in-
clude children in their plans for family. So, the United States might want
to be a safe haven for the married lesbian couple or the single gay man as
a way of putting into practice a belief in both familial and procreative
pluralism.
Robertson, Procreative Liberty and the Control of Conception, Pregnancy and Childbirth, 69
VA. L. REv. 405, 428-33 (1983) [hereinafter Robertson, Procreative Liberty]; John A. Robert-
son, Embryos, Families, and Procreative Liberty: The Legal Structure of the New Reproduc-
tion, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 939,958-67 (1986) [hereinafter Robertson, The Legal Structure of the
New Reproduction]. Other scholars, legal and otherwise, however, have been substantially
less inclined to extend the same broad right to procreate using ART. See, e.g., Jennifer L
Rosato, The Children of ART (Assisted Reproductive Technology): Should the Law Protect
Them from Harm?, 2004 UTAH L. REV. 57, 59-62 (2004) (recommending both state and fed-
eral regulation of assisted reproduction in the interest of avoiding harm to children born of
such technologies); Maura A. Ryan, The Argument for Unlimited Procreative Liberty: A Femi-
nist Critique, 20 HASTINGS CENTER. REP. 6, 7 (July 1990) (arguing that "[t]he view of off-
spring presupposed in such a position is unacceptable from a feminist perspective; further,
treating the act of reproducing in such a way has serious implications for efforts to bring about
a society free of oppression.").
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D. Justice Concerns: Surrogacy
Surrogacy arrangements have been happening in the United States
for decades, and causing controversy, 128 but the outsourcing of this spe-
cific type of reproductive labor to developing nations, like India, has ex-
acerbated concerns about the practice and its potential for harm. 129 For
some, surrogacy marks the height of what is wrong with ART and its
potential to transform society in negative ways.130 Especially in its tradi-
tional form, in which the surrogate mother provides the egg used to cre-
ate a child, surrogacy raises the specter of baby selling and women as
wombs in a manner that is more visible than the selling of gametes.13'
Where subjugation and exploitation of women are concerns, especially
for women of color and low-income women, surrogacy is near the fore-
front of the discussion. This level of concern, coupled with the growth
of surrogacy in developing nations, makes this a ripe arena for discussion
as to why and how travel to developed nations differs from, and should
be analyzed separately from, travel to developing nations.
Surrogacy as practiced in the United States is not well documented.
There have been no large-scale, multi-year studies about the experiences
of surrogates nor has there been substantial data collection about who
uses surrogates, how they are paid, or what the contracts between surro-
gate mothers and the individuals who hire them typically look like. 132
As a result, much of the information about United States-based surrogacy
centers comes from anecdotes or court cases that take place when there is
128 See, e.g., Elizabeth S. Scott, Surrogacy and the Politics of Commodification, 72 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 109, 112-20 (2009) (describing the legal history of surrogacy in the
United States and the impact of the Baby M. case on legislation regulating the practice). See
also In re Baby M., 537 A.2d 1227, 1240 (N.J. 1988) (holding that commercial surrogacy
contracts are against public policy in New Jersey).
129 See Sarmishta Subramanian, Wombs for Rent, MACLEAN'S, July 2, 2007, at 40, 41
(describing the commercial surrogacy market in India). Although India has been the subject of
media attention on a national scale, there are serious concerns about surrogacy practices in
other nations with a high population of economically vulnerable women. For instance, police
in Thailand rescued fourteen Vietnamese women, seven of whom were impregnated by an
illegal "surrogate breeding ring." See Thai Police Free Women From Surrogate Baby Ring,
AFP (Feb.24, 2011), http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5gXBt7gEuqdnil4
KYH2zcvjZvsFpQ?docld=CNG.e4206a773bl64839cl8a6b3802794fe5.6dl. To the extent
that there are concerns about human trafficking for fertility purposes, protecting surrogates is
likely more possible in a country in which there are opportunities to legally make these ar-
rangements and establish judicial oversight.
130 See Feminist Perspectives on Reproduction and the Family, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PHIL., http://plato.stanford.edulentries/feminism-family/#3.2 (last updated Jan. 5, 2010).
131 See Katha Pollitt, The Strange Case of Baby M., NATION, May 23, 1987, available at
http://www.thenation.com/article/strange-case-baby-m#.
132 The first ethnography of the experiences of gestational surrogates was published in
2010, but that book focuses on Jewish Israelis. See ELLY TEMAN, BIRTHING A MOTCHER: THE
SURROGATE BODY AND THE PREGNANT SELF 2-4 (2010). One imagines that the experience of
gestational surrogacy is different in a very pro-natalist nation that strongly supports and highly
regulates the practice.
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a breakdown between the parties.13 3 Even so, it is possible to make some
claims about the surrogate population in the United States.
For instance, women acting as surrogates in the United States, at
least within the brokered element of the market, 1 34 are generally not in a
wholly precarious economic position or completely reliant on using their
reproductive capacity to find economic stability. Instead, because of the
desire of the ART consumer to hire a woman in possession of certain
qualities, including good overall health, decent health insurance, and a
deep altruistic streak,13 5 surrogates in the United States are typically mar-
ried, have children of their own, and are economically stable, though
certainly not wealthy. 136 Depending on the agency, the fee paid to a
surrogate in the United States can start at as little as $24,000 and go up to
$37,000, depending upon a variety of factors, including the number of
fetuses the surrogate will carry and her prior successful surrogacy exper-
iences.13 7 Of course, the surrogacy fee is one small slice of the total
expense of a surrogacy arrangement-fees for lawyers, counseling, med-
133 See, e.g., Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 778 (Cal. 1993) (in which intended par-
ents triumphed over gestational surrogate who sought custody of the child to whom she gave
birth); In re Baby M., 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988) (in which traditional surrogate was found to
be the legal mother of a child to whom she gave birth, but lost custody to the biological father).
134 There are numerous agencies in the United States acting as brokers between intended
parents and surrogates. See SPAR, supra note 56, at 3; Stephanie Saul, Building a Baby, with
Few Ground Rules, N.Y. TIMES, Dec 13, 2009, at Al [hereinafter Saul, Building a Baby].
Outside of these agencies, which are not subject to licensing or other regulation by state or
federal governments, potential surrogates and potential parents can find each other on websites
like Surrogate Mothers Online (http://www.surromomsonline.com/) which post classified ads
for intended parents and potential surrogates. Brokered deals are no guarantee of a successful
arrangement as evidenced by the disastrous implosion of a baby-selling ring spearheaded by a
well-known reproductive lawyer. See Prominent Surrogacy Attorney Sentenced to Prison for
Her Role in Baby-Selling Case, FBI (Feb. 24, 2012), http://www.fbi.gov/sandiegolpress-re-
leases/2012/prominent-surrogacy-attorney-sentenced-to-prison-for-her-role-in-baby-selling-
case. California was also the site of a scandal when the owners of a surrogacy agency called
SurroGenesis abruptly shut the agency's doors and disappeared with approximately two mil-
lion dollars paid by clients and owed to surrogates, some of whom were mid-pregnancy. See
Stephanie Saul, Would-Be Parents Find Surrogate Agency Closed, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 21, 2009,
at A14 [hereinafter Saul, Would-Be Parents Find Surrogate Agency Closed] Even so, do-it-
yourself deals may have a greater likelihood of ending in disaster for all of the parties in-
volved. See Mark Hansen, As Surrogacy Becomes More Popular, Legal Problems Proliferate,
ABA J., March 2011, at 53, 55-56.
135 See Melanie Thernstrom, Meet the Twiblings, N.Y. TIMES MAO., Jan. 2, 2010, at 30
(describing the process of hiring two gestational surrogates to carry children for an infertile
couple); Alex Kuczynski, Her Body, My Baby, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 28, 2008), http://www.ny-
times.com/2008/11/30/magazine/30Surrogate-t.html?pagewanted=all&_r-0 (describing the
profiles of gestational surrogates).
136 See Kuczynski, supra note 135.
137 See, e.g., Agency Fees & Surrogate Mother Costs, THE SURROGACY SOURCE, http://
www.thesurrogacysource.com/ip-fees.htm?type=Intended%20Parent (last visited Oct. 26,
2012) (noting that fees for surrogates begin at $24,000, but that experienced surrogates can
earn $32,000-$37,000).
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ical care, travel, housing, and a range of other costs can make the final
price tag of a surrogacy arrangement soar as high as six-figures.138
By contrast, in India, surrogacy arrangements take place within a
context of very lopsided power dynamics and access to resources. 139
While the standard of hiring women who are married and who have al-
ready given birth to children exists overseas as it exists in the United
States,140 the lives of Indian surrogates are substantially less economi-
cally stable than those of surrogates hired in the United States.' 4 ' The
"globalization of reproduction" as practiced in India involves hiring wo-
men who often come from harsh economic circumstances.1 4 2 Dr.
Nayana Patel runs a successful fertility clinic in Anand, India where, at
any given time, there might be six or seven pregnant women living in her
facility while waiting to give birth to children for paying customers.143
Patel's surrogates are paid anywhere from $3,900 to $6,500 for their re-
productive labor; Patel sets the fee for each surrogate based on her own
criteria. 144
Even the high end of this pay scale is low by U.S. standards, though
the payments made to these Indian surrogates is enough to substantially
change their life circumstances.14 5 For instance, one woman who
worked for Patel as a surrogate used her $3,900 fee (150,000 rupees) to
purchase a two-bedroom apartment for her family.146 Other women use
their surrogacy fees to buy much needed medical care for sick children or
pay school fees for children who would otherwise need to leave school in
order to help support their struggling families.14 7 For Patel's surrogates,
138 See Ali & Kelley, supra note 66 (noting that a surrogacy arrangement can cost be-
tween $40,000 and $120,000).
139 See Subramanian, supra note 129, at 40.
140 See id. at 44. In one small study of Indian surrogates, all of the women interviewed
were married with children and ranged in age from 20-45 years old. Amrita Pande, "At Least
I Am Not Sleeping with Anyone": Resisting the Stigma of Commercial Surrogacy in India, 36
FEMINIST STUDIES 292, 297 (2010).
141 Subramanian, supra note 129, at 44
142 Id. at 41-42.
143 Id. at 41, 44.
144 Id. at 47.
145 See id. (discussing that $2,500 is enough to change the lives of a middle-class Indian
family). In some ways, the comparison to the pay scale in the United States is perhaps inapt.
A woman in India whose surrogacy fee matches or exceeds what she earns with years of paid
work, and that allows her to substantially lift the material circumstances of her family, is left
much better off economically than a woman in the United States whose fee, often hovering
around $20,000, might, in some cases, represent a year or less of salary. Ali & Kelley, supra
note 66 (noting that surrogacy arrangement in the United States generally involve fees between
$20,000-$25,000 for the surrogate). In this sense, the ultimate meaning of the pay might be
significantly more consequential in India even if it is leaps and bounds less than what is of-
fered in the United States. See Subramanian, supra, note 129, at 46.
146 Subramanian, supra note 129, at 40.
147 See id. at 44-45.
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their fees exceed what they would earn from many years of conventional
forms of paid work.14 8 It should be noted, though, that not every person
running a fertility clinic in India is necessarily as generous as Patel, who
reports that she also provides ongoing primary healthcare to her surro-
gates even after they have completed their work for her.14 9 Given the
lack of extensive regulation in India, it is certain that there are unscrupu-
lous actors who take serious advantage of the women engaging in this
labor. 5 0
Regarding the fear of exploitation, a surrogate working in the
United States may have greater power in her relationship with the in-
tended parents than a surrogate in India. For one, she may be able to
communicate with the intended parents in a common language, giving
her an opportunity to talk to them without the potential for important
details getting lost in translation. The pool of available surrogates may
be smaller in the United States, and the work and costs of finding some-
one to play this role is likely greater, also giving the surrogate more
bargaining power. Ironically, the fact that the law on surrogacy in the
United States is unformed and sometimes hostile to commercial arrange-
ments may also put the surrogate in better standing if, at the end of a
pregnancy, she desires to keep the child.'51 This is because in the ab-
sence of statutes or case law that dictate otherwise, the law will consider
a woman who gives birth to a child to be that child's legal mother, even
if she has no genetic tie to the child.152
148 See, e.g., id. at 40 (stating that one woman was paid "a sum that would take her years
to earn in her job as a clerk at an incense store or with her occasional work as a government
security guard."). A fee of $3,000 can be the equivalent of four to five years of family income
for an Indian surrogate. Pande, supra note 140, at 297.
149 See Subramanian, supra note 129, at 47.
150 Margot Cohen, A Search for a Surrogate Leads to India, WALL ST. J., Oct. 8, 2009, at
DI.
151 See Saul, Building a Baby, supra note 134. As a normative matter, laws that create
ambiguity about children born to gestational surrogates do not serve the interests of intended
parents, children, or gestational surrogates. See id. Arguably, a state that has no specific law
in place and that defaults to gestation also creates an ambiguity of sorts by failing to respond to
the reality of post-coital reproduction. But at least in those states courts can default to rules
formed in a world in which coital reproduction was the only way to create babies. Others have
argued persuasively that markets in reproduction would function better with clearer standards
for parentage, and beyond. As one author wrote,
In an effort to bring order to the current chaos, some experts have called for a uni-
form federal law governing surrogacy. Such a standard would prevent forum shop-
ping for states with more favorable surrogacy laws-which reduces the bargaining
power of individual surrogates; draws prospective parents from all over the country
with the promise of easy, risk-free transactions; and allows agencies to get around
the most restrictive state laws.
Hansen, supra note 134, at 57.
152 See, e.g., In re Parentage of a Child by T.J.S. and A.L.S., 16 A.3d 386, 389 (N.J.
2011) (determining that despite a pre-birth order, the New Jersey Parentage Act does not con-
fer parentage on the wife in a couple that commissioned a gestational surrogacy).
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None of this is to say that there are no serious questions about the
practice of surrogacy in the United States. There have been scandals
related to surrogacy arrangements, including financial scandals involving
agencies that misled surrogates and intended parents,' 53 and tragic court
cases involving surrogates who did not want to relinquish a child, or
intended parents who did not want a child whose existence is owed to
third-party reproduction. 15 4 These problems are almost inevitable in
such a personal and volatile set of transactions. Nevertheless, setting
these concerns aside, the distinctions this Article has drawn between sur-
rogacy as practiced in the United States and surrogacy as practiced in
India indicate that United States-based surrogacy practices engender less
concern about the powerlessness of surrogates and the extent of their
deprivation and exploitation than it does in developing nations. But it is
worthwhile to test that initial instinct with a more stringent analysis of
ethics.
The language of ethics is useful for thinking about what distinc-
tions, if any, may be drawn between surrogacy in the United States and
surrogacy in India, serving the larger purpose of this article-to contem-
plate why the interests of ART consumers and sellers are served when
people travel to the United States to take advantage of ART. The ethics
of a particular practice can potentially be evaluated differently across
time, space, and geography. 55 The surrogacy example proves this point
when viewed through Michael Sandel's rubric of coercion and corrup-
tion.' 5 6 Sandel argues that some markets corrupt and some markets co-
erce. He urges rejecting unjust markets that "arise when people buy and
sell things under conditions of severe inequality or dire economic neces-
153 In 2009, a California based surrogacy broker, SurroGenesis, found itself the subject of
several media reports and, ultimately, a federal investigation after money meant to pay surro-
gacy fees and medical expenses disappeared. See Kimi Yoshino, Fears Over Surrogacy
Funds: Firm's Alleged Halt in Payments to Surrogates Raises Prospective Parents' Concerns,
L.A. Time-s, Mar. 21, 2009, at A3.
154 See, e.g., Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 778 (Cal. 1993) (intended parents tri-
umphed over gestational surrogate who sought custody of the child to whom she gave birth);
Buzzanca v. Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998) (involving intended parents
who paid a surrogate to carry their child, and later the biological parents sought a court order
to be named the legal parents of the child); In re Baby M., 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988) (tradi-
tional surrogate was found to be the legal mother of a child to whom she gave birth, but lost
custody to the biological father).
155 As the anthropologist Lynn M. Morgan notes: "Bioethicists have joined the quest to
become more culturally sensitive, acknowledging that philosophy is too often rooted in cul-
ture-bound assumptions phrased in the language of universal truths." Lynn M. Morgan, "Life
Begins When They Steal Your Bicycle": Cross-Cultural Practices of Personhood at the Begin-
nings and Ends of Life, 34 J.L. Mrio. & EtHics 8, 10 (2006). In other words, our ethical
understandings are rooted in culture and therefore are subject to the critique that they speak not
to universal understanding, but to the understanding of a particular time and place.
156 See MICHAEL J. SANDEL, WHAT MONEY CAN'T Buy: THE MORAL LIMITs OF MARKEIS
43-47 (2012) (describing different ways in which markets can corrupt or coerce).
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sity."is5 In these circumstances, "market exchanges are not necessarily
as voluntary as market enthusiasts suggest."158 By this measure, people
who bring their fertility quest to India in order to hire surrogates at
cheaper rates and/or avoid bans on commercial surrogacy in their home
countries are, in fact, participating in a markedly coercive exchange be-
cause it is an exchange in which the background conditions of the ex-
change are substantially unfair.159 Women in India acting as surrogates
do not necessarily do so in an environment in which they have access to
a multiplicity of choices and find that surrogacy best suits their skills and
interests. 160 Instead, within the constraints of culture and economics,
they may acquiesce to an act that would hold little or no appeal to them
in a world that offered substantially more diverse choices for survival
and flourishing.161
Arguably, in the United States, the background conditions between
typical commissioning intended parents and a typical surrogate mother
are less troubling, in part because of the desires of the intended parents
for healthy and well-insured surrogates as described earlier. The less
gaping divide between buyer and seller in the American surrogacy mar-
ket allows for the conclusion that this element of objection to the ex-
change is less salient in United States-based CBFC. This is not to say
that the claim is completely without merit in the United States, but it
does not resonate in the same way. While one can certainly still make
the claim that the market in surrogate bodies is coercive, whether in the
United States or abroad, the extent of that coercion seems to be lessened
when the people involved are not from countries with drastically oppos-
ing overall economic structures.
A separate issue is whether the market in surrogacy corrupts, which
Sandel describes as "the degrading effect of market valuation and ex-
change on certain goods and practice."I 62 This critique goes to "the
moral importance of the goods at stake, the ones said to be degraded by
market valuation and exchange." 63 It should be clear that the corruption
argument is "intrinsic" and therefore "cannot be met by fixing the back-
ground conditions within which market exchanges take place."1 64 By
157 Michael J. Sandel, Professor of Government, Harvard University, The Tanner Lec-
tures on Human Values: What Money Can't Buy: The Moral Limits of Markets, delivered at
Brasenose College, Oxford, (May 11 -12, 1998), at 89, 94 [hereinafter Sandel Lecture] avail-
able at http://tannerlectures.utah.edullectures/documents/sandelOO.pdf.
158 Id.
I59 Id. at 94-95.
160 See Arlie Hochschild, Childbirth at the Global Crossroads, AM. PROSPEu (Sept. 19,
2009), http:/Iprospect.org/article/childbirth-global-crossroads-0.
161 Id.
162 Sandel, supra note 157, at 94.
163 Id. at 95.
164 Id.
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this measure, whether consent is coerced or voluntary is irrelevant to the
question of whether placing a value on babies or on a woman's womb
degrades these "products" to such an extent that the market must be con-
demned. Here, the objection carries just as strongly through the Indian
market in surrogates as it does through the United States. In either case,
one can believe that the societal consequence of creating commercial
transactions that result in the birth of a child and the transfer of rights
from a gestational carrier to intended parents in exchange for money is at
least troubling, if not deeply concerning. If the market corrupts, one can
vociferously argue that it should be shut down, and if it is not shut down,
its reach should at least be confined as much as possible. If this is a fair
argument, then we should not only condemn the market as an unethical
practice, legality notwithstanding, but we should also discourage people
from participating in it, no matter whether they are native users or people
seeking CBFC.
While it may be tempting to use people seeking CBFC as pawns in
an attempt to create a more generally stringent regulation of surrogacy,
we should be hesitant to go down the road of using travel status to mark
some desires for genetic parenthood as unworthy of satisfaction. If it
became United States' policy to exclude people from engaging in surro-
gacy on United States soil based on a corruption rationale, it would seem
ludicrous to limit this ban only to CBFC. If the surrogacy market cor-
rupts, then it corrupts for all, not just the few who seek CBFC, and it
should therefore be inaccessible to all.
Even if the surrogacy consumers will leave the country once their
wanted children are born, the impact of such a trade on our society will
remain. In other words, the country in which the deed is done will expe-
rience some taint from CBFC even if the most pernicious impact will
come mostly from native users, assuming that most of them will raise
their surrogate conceived children on United States' soil. It is these na-
tive families that remain in our midst who will ostensibly slowly rend the
fabric of family as we know it. If, as a nation, we are insufficiently
motivated to end this trade as practiced by the people who are native
users of the technology, it is difficult, if not impossible, to offer solid
reasoning for making the technology inaccessible to others.
Importantly, the conversation here is not about providing insurance
coverage for people seeking CBFC, or loosening any existing restrictions
that may exist, or even facilitating such arrangements. The focus here is
simply on the question of complicating or banning access to surrogacy
for a specific population of people based only on where they are from.
That this nation, unlike others, has not seen fit to completely ban com-
mercial surrogacy, either because we do not completely believe that it
corrupts or because we are more concerned with other things, is a con-
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vincing indicator that the practice's perceived or possible impact on the
larger society is insufficient to spur reaction. Until we create consensus
on whether the market should be open for anyone, the market should
remain open to all those who would use it as long as they do not violate
existing laws in doing so and can find a willing practitioner to provide
the requested care.
m. MORE JUSTICE CONCERNS: DISCARDED EMBRYOS, LIVES
UNLIVED, AND CBFC
"Cross border reproductive care is an under
recognised [sic] and unregulated phenomenon that is
likely to increase as ART technology becomes ever
more and possibly more attractive . . . . " 165
A more vexing set of concerns raised in the proffered scenarios is
how to react to foreign rules and laws focused not on a desire to deprive
individuals of access to genetic parenthood, but on a governmental obli-
gation to act in the interest of its citizens. This includes diminishing
practices like sex-selection that unfairly and disproportionately target
girls, 166 or more broadly, a perceived obligation to protect the category
of procreation and human reproduction, i.e., by refusing to allow market
principles to overtake the process of creating and giving birth to new
human beings. In these circumstances, the balance between protecting
an individual interest in family and procreation against a potentially more
far-reaching societal interest is perhaps harder to do. A native country or
its government might say that it is because the traveler will return with a
child and integrate her expanded family into the community that the
United States needs to be more restrained in its provisions for fertility
services. The societal consequences of choices made by people acces-
sing CBFC may be partially born by the country that hosts the traveler,
but they will also weigh heavily upon, and perhaps most heavily upon,
the countries to which those travelers return. In other words, the political
and social ramifications may be substantial enough to warrant being
taken seriously by the country that will not experience the brunt of those
ramifications.
If India wants to reduce the number of missing girls, it will not be
pleased if those with the wherewithal to do so travel abroad to avoid
strictures against sex selection. If Italy wants to show respect for natu-
165 A. McKelvey et al., The Impact of Cross-Border Reproductive Care or 'Fertility
Tourism' on NHS Maternity Services, 116 BJOG 1520, 1523 (2009).
166 See Sabu M. George, Millions of Missing Girls: From Fetal Sexing to High Technol-
ogy: Sex Selection in India, 26 PRENATAL DIAGNOSIs 604, 604-605 (2006); Ted Plafker, Sex
Selection in China Sees 117 Boys Born for Every 100 Girls, 324 BRI[IsH Mo. J. 1233, 1233
(2002).
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rall 67 procreation and the human variation that it brings, including dis-
ease or disability, by requiring the transfer of all embryos made outside
of the body, it too may find fault with a country that turns a blind eye to
its concerns. Similarly, if the United Kingdom thinks that all children
have a right to know their genetic origins, the society suffers when chil-
dren whose parents use ART in the United States do so with gametes
sold anonymously. In these cases, open borders, unlike discrimination
against single people or families created by gays and lesbians, facilitate
and support an arguably discriminatory act, rather than rejecting that act.
Perhaps CBFC may be devastating enough to a country's character such
that not only should travelers feel bound by the laws of home, but the
destination country should also seek to effectuate the moral precepts that
undergird those laws when foreign citizens are on their soil.
One response to this claim is that if there is such an obligation to
respect the rules of one's home, it is the obligation and right of the home
country to enforce these rules, rather than an obligation of the destination
country. As described in parts earlier, countries that wish to assert power
beyond their borders to restrict the actions of their citizens can take steps
to make the option of CBFC less attractive.168 Some nations create sanc-
tions for physicians or others who promote CBFC.169 In other countries,
laws complicate the process of creating a legally recognized relationship
with a child born through ART on foreign soil.17o This serves the pur-
pose of creating a serious impediment to fertility travel if one plans to
return home afterwards.
167 The distinction being drawn here between natural and unnatural procreation is meant
only to highlight this element of the critique of assisted reproduction and not to embrace any
categorization of ART as unnatural.
168 See discussion supra Part L.A.
169 See Ferraretti et al., supra note 21, at 262.
170 New Zealand warns its citizens who engage in international surrogacy arrangements
that:
1. being named as a parent on a foreign birth certificate for a child born as a result of
a surrogacy arrangement, does not mean that the birth certificate will meet New
Zealand immigration or citizenship requirements, and
2. any adoption or guardianship orders issued by an overseas court for a child born
overseas as a result of a surrogacy arrangement will not necessarily meet New Zea-
land immigration or citizenship requirements, and,
3. that the issuing of a foreign passport does not necessarily entitle the child to New
Zealand citizenship.
International Surrogacy, CHILD YOUTH & FAMILY OF N.Z., http://www.cyf.govt.nz/docu-
ments/adoption/international-surrogacy-information-sheet.pdf (last visited Apr. 9, 2011). Fur-
ther, a surrogate mother is the legal mother of a child under New Zealand law and "as the egg
and sperm donor will usually have no legal parental relationship with a child born as a result of
a surrogacy arrangement, the child is not entitled to be issued with New Zealand citizenship by
descent, and travel documents will not be issued for the child." Id. All of this means that
parents, even genetic parents, who have a child via surrogate in a foreign country will need to
do an adoption once they return to New Zealand in order to become legal parents of their child.
Id.
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The adoption laws of a destination country may create impediments
to family formation, as one Japanese man discovered when his wife left
him during the pendency of a surrogate pregnancy in India, and he found
that India would not let him adopt as a single father.' 7 1 Similarly, some
countries make it difficult to establish citizenship in the home country for
a child who is born outside of that country's borders to a gestational
carrier who is a United States citizen. In April 2011, a French court
ruled against the Mennessons, a husband and wife raising ten-year-old
twin girls in France who were born to a gestational surrogate in Califor-
nia.172 The family was attempting to establish French citizenship for the
girls who are American citizens due to the circumstances of their
birth.17 3
Still other travelers will find that the adoption laws of their country
will not let them create the legally recognized families that they seek
even if they are able to bring a child into a relationship by accessing
services in the United States. For instance, a same-sex couple not al-
lowed to legally marry in a home country may be similarly barred from
being the adoptive parents of a child who is born through an arrangement
facilitated in the United States that would not have been sanctioned in the
home country.17 4 Arguably, where the laws of a home country will
thwart the family building goals of reproductive travelers, the travel
should not be undertaken. But for many people for whom having a child
is paramount, and particularly having a child with whom they share a
genetic connection, the risks inherent in engaging in CBFC will be worth
171 The complicated entanglement of laws relating not just to ART, but to adoption, can
create unforeseen complications for those accessing CBFC. One Japanese man discovered this
truth when he and his wife hired a surrogate in India to bear a child for them. The couple
divorced during the process and the ex-wife was no longer interested in parenting the child
born to the surrogate, though her husband remained eager to be the child's legal father. Unfor-
tunately, Indian law does not allow single men to adopt. Consequently, the man spent many
months wrangling with Indian authorities before he was able to leave the country with his
child. Marcy Darnovsky, Complications of Surrogacy: The Case of Baby Manji, BlopounfcAL
TIMES, Sept. 18, 2009, http://www.biopoliticaltimes.org/article.php?id=4923.
172 See France Rules Against Children of Surrogate Mothers, SIFY NEws, http://www.
sify.com/news/france-rules-against-children-of-surrogate-mothers-news-others-lejrOnbhdee.
html (last updated Apr. 9, 2011).
173 See id.
174 According to the Human Rights Campaign:
At this point, it is very difficult to pursue an international adoption as an
openly same-sex couple, or as an openly single LGBT person. Many of the coun-
tries that have children for adoption are extremely prejudiced against LGBT people,
and either have explicit laws or policies or implicit cultural or societal "codes" that
are against LGBT adoption. Presently, even the most welcoming agencies are exer-
cising extreme caution about representing any LGBT people for international adop-
tion because the process in general is becoming more challenging and even non-
LGB couples are likely to face increased barriers.
Adoption Options Overview, HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN, http://www.hrc.org/resources/entry/
adoption-options-overview (last visited October 5, 2012).
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it. The fact that there are risks to CBFC suggests some obligation on the
part of any agency that brokers such deals or attorneys who participate in
these deals to make sure that clients are well informed of the pitfalls of
their choice to travel for access to ART, but this does not require or
suggest that a ban on such procedures would be appropriate or necessary.
Further, as noted, the fact that home countries can, and do, act to protect
their own interests diminishes the need for the United States to pursue
policies that arguably violate its own commitment to pluralism.
All of this discussion, though, begs the question of whether there is
value or valor in providing access to ART tools that will be used in ways
that potentially denigrate whole communities of people. As a starting
point, one can reject the inquiry based on the idea that if there is a con-
cern about sex-selection as a means of reinforcing sexism, the problem
that needs to be dealt with is sexism, not sex-selection. Barring people
from engaging in sex-selection is not a way of changing the underlying
foundation of a society in which pressure for boys is so significant that
people will use a variety of technological means to have sons rather than
daughters.175 One could make a similar claim about concerns that PGD
undermines the worth of people who are living with disabilities. 7 6
Again, if the goal is to change how the society perceives disabilities, the
use of PGD is a symptom, not a cause, of that perception. This is also a
situation in which it is clear that the impetus for change must come from
within the society and that choices made in other nations will have negli-
gible impact on domestic norms to the extent that those choices are un-
known or unknowable by the home country.
There are certainly instances in which world-wide cooperation to
stamp out a universally condemned practice is appropriate and nations
seek and expect cooperation when it comes to citizens who cross borders
to engage in these behaviors. For instance, as part of an international
effort to protect minors from sex trafficking, the United States punishes
its citizens who travel to foreign countries to engage in sexual conduct
that is illegal in those countries and in the United States, such as sexual
contact with minors.' 7 7 It is a violation of federal law for a citizen or a
permanent resident of the United States to travel in order to engage in
175 See, e.g., Julian Savulescu & Edgar Dahl, Sex Selection and Preimplantation Diagno-
sis: A Response to the Ethics Committee of American Society of Reproductive Medicine, 15
Hum. REPROD. 1879, 1880 (2000) (rejecting the idea that sex selection is a sexist act, at least
as it is practiced in the West, or that it reinforces gender bias in the larger society).
176 See, e.g., Amy Harmon, In New Tests for Fetal Defects, Agonizing Choices for Par-
ents, N.Y. TIMFS, June 20, 2004, at NI (describing arguments by advocates for those living
with disabilities about the relationship between genetic testing and eugenics).
177 The relevant statutory sections reads as follows:
(b) Travel with intent to engage in illicit sexual conduct-A person who travels in
interstate commerce or travels into the United States, or a United States citizen or an
alien admitted for permanent residence in the United States who travels in foreign
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sex tourism.17 8 The relevant statute proscribes "travel with intent to en-
gage in illicit sexual conduct" or "engaging in illicit sexual conduct in
foreign places."17 9 There are international instruments (conventions) on
child prostitution, sale of children, and inter-country adoption, which
speak to the global consensus on the issue of crimes against children.18 0
In light of a relatively world-wide consensus that crimes against mi-
nors, sexual and otherwise, deserve to be severely punished and deterred
through the use of the substantial weight of the criminal law, it makes
complete sense that the United States and other nations cooperate across
national borders in stopping this behavior. CBFC, however, is not sex
tourism. While it involves the creation of children, it certainly does not
involve the systematic sexual abuse and exploitation of children. While
some may argue that commodification of reproduction is not good for a
society, in that it undermines important values about family and relation-
ships between parents and children,' 81 it is difficult to argue that bringing
commerce, for the purpose of engaging in any illicit sexual conduct with another
person shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 30 years, or both.
(c) Engaging in illicit sexual conduct in foreign places.-Any United States citizen
or alien admitted for permanent residence who travels in foreign commerce, and
engages in any illicit sexual conduct with another person shall be fined under this
title or imprisoned not more than 30 years, or both.
(f) Definition.-As used in this section, the term "illicit sexual conduct" means (1) a
sexual act (as defined in section 2246) with a person under 18 years of age that
would be in violation of chapter 109A if the sexual act occurred in the special mari-
time and territorial jurisdiction of the United States; or (2) any commercial sex act
(as defined in section 1591) with a person under 18 years of age.
Transportation of Minors, 18 U.S.C. § 2423 (2006).
178 See id. See, e.g., Heather Montgomery, Buying Innocence: Child-Sex Tourists in
Thailand, 29 THIRD WORLD Q. 903, 903 (2008) (describing and analyzing sex tourism with
adult women and children in Thailand); Joan Phillips, Female Sex Tourism in Barbados: A
Postcolonial Perspective, 14 BROWN J. WORLDo An,. 201, 201 (2008); Patrick Vrancken &
Kasturi Chetty, International Child Sex Tourism: A South African Perspective, 53 J. AFRICAN
L. 111, 112 (2009) (describing sex tourism in South Africa).
179 18 U.S.C. § 2423.
180 See Hague Conference on Private International Law: Final Act of the 17th Session,
Including the Convention on Protection of Children and Co-operation in Respect of Intercoun-
try Adoption, May 29, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1134 (1993); Optional Protocols to the Convention on
the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict and on the Sale of
Children, Child Prostitution and Child Pornography, G.A. Res. 54/263, U.N. Doc. A/54/263
(May 25, 2000).
181 See, e.g., Anderson, supra note 116, at 90 ("To recognize the legality of commercial
surrogate contracts would undermine the integrity of families by giving public sanction to a
practice which expresses contempt for the moral and emotional ties which bind a mother to her
children, legitimates the view that these ties are merely the product of arbitrary will, properly
loosened by the offering of a monetary incentive, and fails to respect the claims of genetic and
gestational ties to children which provide children with a more secure place in the world than
commerce can supply."); Sandel, supra note 157, at 103 ("The marketing of Ivy League sperm
commodifies the male reproductive capacity in much the way commercial surrogacy com-
modifies pregnancy. Both treat procreation as a product for profit rather than a human capac-
ity to be exercised according to norms of love, intimacy, and responsibility.").
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wanted children into the world who will be cared for by loving parents is
akin to abuse. The dissimilarities continue, but the end point is that the
diversity of regulation of ART speaks to the lack of an international con-
sensus on what is and is not acceptable reproductive behavior. Where
such a consensus does not exist, there is no convincing rationale for re-
questing extra-territorial cooperation to enforce culturally specific
laws.182
A. CFBC as a Safety Valve
Rather than undermining the lawmaking of other countries, it is pos-
sible to imagine that the role played by the United States in the global
market for ART is actually a critical one. It might be the case that other
countries feel freedom to restrict choices within their borders because
they are well aware that access to such care can be found elsewhere.
Richard Storrow suggests that prohibitions created in the United King-
dom, including the commercial surrogacy ban, were created with full
knowledge that citizens who desired such treatment could access it by
leaving home.183 He writes, "[i]t is in precisely this way that fertility
tourism acts as a moral safety valve permitting national parliaments to
express local sentiments while simultaneously acknowledging the moral
autonomy of those who do not agree with those sentiments." 8 4 Others
describe the lack of harmonization of ART laws, which facilitate migra-
tion, as "reduc[ing] moral conflicts and contribut[ing] to the peaceful
coexistence of different ethical and religious views." 85 If these scholars
are correct, then a refusal to enforce the rules of an origin nation on
United States soil is, in fact, in keeping with that nation's delicate at-
tempt to create a particular type of society on its own soil; a society that
recognizes that its diverse citizens might want things that the govern-
ments deems not in the interest of the society as a whole. Nations with
some semblance of freedom of movement are well aware that their citi-
zens are not trapped within their borders. When those citizens use their
passports to exercise a desire for a freedom not available to them at
home, that is an exercise of their rights as citizens.
One might argue in this circumstance that the United States should
be wary of embracing a role as a place that is insufficiently cognizant
and incapable of being legislatively responsive to practices that raise se-
rious red flags about harms to societies and children. On the other hand,
the country could be playing a vital role within our flat world where it is
182 But see Cohen, supra note 11, at 1373-86 (arguing that jurisdictions may in fact have
good reasons to seek extra-territorial enforcement of their laws related to procreation).
183 Storrow, supra note 82, at 305.
184 Id.
185 Ferraretti et al., supra note 21, at 262.
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necessary and right to support pluralistic choices about procreation and
family. If it is right that countries feel less constrained to liberalize their
laws because they know that their citizens can access care elsewhere, in
keeping with the earlier discussion about accessing CBFC as an act of
resistance, the United States can think of its open borders as a safe haven
for those who would be denied fairness and equality in their countries of
origin. This is in keeping with a vision of the United States as a pluralist
nation with an ethos of equality in access to human goods, including
freedom to procreate.
Of course in many nations, only those with class privilege will be
able to express their disagreement with their nation's laws by leaving.
This does not, however, mean that people who remain within the country
will see no benefit from the availability of CBFC. Over time, the out-
ward flow of citizens may force countries to reconsider the strictness of
their own rules and perhaps even change those rules to respond to the
needs of their citizens. The United Kingdom reconsidered its policy on
pre-implantation diagnosis after a widely publicized case of citizens
leaving to access a variation of this service abroad.186 If reconsiderations
of this type occur, the United States should feel that its role in leading
nations toward more inclusive policies is justified and productive.
B. Protecting the Public's Health
Finally, a nation may seek to diminish access to CBFC not only
because of the psychic consequences to the society, but also because of
potential costs to the local public health system. As Debora Spar sug-
gests, "[a] cross-border market for reproduction also means that societies
that oppose assisted reproduction may nevertheless pay its costs. For
who can prove that premature quintuplets born in Bremen were con-
ceived in Istanbul?"'8 7 One small-scale study of the British National
Health Service Maternity Services found that a significant number of
multi-fetal pregnancies had their genesis in patients receiving fertility
care outside of the United Kingdom.' 88 Obviously, because of the
unique nature of the care being provided, the consequences of seeking
CBFC influence "not just the health and well-being of one individual but
also that of the child or children born of the process, as well as potential
186 See Whitaker, supra note 2. In 2008, after Parliament determined that pre-implanta-
tion tissue typing (PTT) was an acceptable use of technology, the HFEA reconsidered its
stance on so-called savior siblings and decided that it would grant permission for this specific
use of reproductive technology in certain cases. See id.; PTT Regulated, supra note 2.
187 Debora Spar, Reproductive Tourism and the Regulatory Map, 352 New ENG. J. MED
531, 533 (2005).
188 See McKelvey et al., supra note 164, at 1523 ("Fertility treatment outside the UK was
responsible for over a quarter of fertility-treated high order multiple pregnancies seen in a UK
specialist multiple pregnancy clinic.").
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future generations."' 89 This concern is more difficult to confront be-
cause it ostensibly has less to do with who is seeking to procreate and
make a family and much more to do with the public health consequences
of such choices for society, families, and children.
Here, though, it appears that there are attempts to harmonize medi-
cal practice across borders to serve the interests of people who are acces-
sing fertility care. 190 An example of this phenomenon is found in
practices related to the number of embryos transferred during an IVF
cycle. Even without the kind of extensive control exercised over fertility
practices in other countries, reproductive physicians in the United States,
through the professional associations that govern them, are becoming
much stricter about promulgating standards for embryo transfer in IVF
calculated to lead to substantial reductions in the number of multiple
pregnancies created as a result of ART use.' 91 This puts United States'
practice closer in line with practices in other parts of the world.192 This
shows that harmonization is absolutely possible when the need is clear
and the resolution supported by medical science.
CONCLUSION
For some, the United States has earned its reputation as a wild fron-
tier where anything goes when it comes to ART. While the Wild
West 93 metaphor has dramatic appeal, it is not accurate, and it deni-
grates both those who work in the industry with care and conscience and
those who travel to the United States, not because they will do anything
to fulfill a desire for parenthood, but because they will do many things to
fulfill this desire.
In a world in which national borders have lost much of their rigid-
ity, CBFC is just one of many services that consumers will seek in fo-
rums that are friendlier because of cost, availability of service, or less
stringent laws. In such a world, denying medical services simply on the
189 Lynn Mainland & Elinor Wilson, Principles of Establishment of the First Interna-
tional Forum on Cross-Border Reproductive Care, 94 FERTHLIfY & S RITY el, e2 (2010).
190 Complete harmonization is unlikely, for as one set of authors explains, an international
consensus on regulation of fertility care and practice, "could not be reached because of a
diversity of traditions, political situations, and medical practices. An international 'consensus'
appears to be a utopia, and we can imagine that if it existed, it would reflect the lowest com-
mon denominator." Conclusion, 87 FERTILITY & STERILIfY S67, S67 (Supp. I 2007).
191 See Practice Comm. of the Am. Soc'y for Reprod. Med. and the Practice Comm. of
the Soc'y for Assisted Reprod. Tech., Guidelines on Number of Embryos Transferred, 92
FERIn-rry & STERILIfY 1518, 1518 (2009).
192 See, e.g., HFEA Guidance Note on Multiple Births, Hum. FERTIISATION EMBRYOL-
OGY AUIH. (Oct. 7, 2011), http://www.hfea.gov.uk/docs/201_ IOCT_7_multiplebirths.pdf.
(discussing practice guidelines for minimizing the number of multiple births in licensed fertil-
ity clinics in the United Kingdom).
193 See Coeytaux et al., supra note 54, at 2.
2012] WELCOME TO THE WILD WEST 393
basis of travel status may in fact thwart the will of other nations, which
can use the United States as a safety valve for their own citizens, and
detract from attempts to position the United States as a nation that em-
braces variations in family structure. At some points, a respect for plural
families may seem to conflict with other values related to public health
or commodification, and where countries feel strongly about these issues,
they have law and policymaking tools at their own disposal to use against
their own citizens. Whether these uses are appropriate is a question for a
different discussion. Here it suffices to say that the United States' posi-
tion that sees wide access to procreative tools as furthering other impor-
tant societal goals warrants respect and should be sustained.

